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CHAPTER I
PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS
An explanation and oriticism ot John Locke's theory ot pro-

perty, a8 he himselt presents it 1n the Segon4 T£eatise
Government, ls the principal aim 01' this theais.

~

elyil

Chapter Pive 01'

"On Property," is thererore tne basic source tram
whiah the matter ot the thesis is drawn. 1 Other parts 01' Locke's
the Treatis"

political theory presented in tne

~eat',e,

e.g., the state 01' na-

ture, the nature, origin, and 1im1ts 01' civil government, are seconduJ to the • tudJ 01' Locke t s theory 01' property.

Because of' the

limited nature 01' this paper, on11 a brier discusslon 01' Locke'.
predeoeasors in the tield 01' property theory is included in this
work. 2 Similarl, only those implioations which immediatel, 1'01low trom the logic ot Looke's own theoP,y are considered.
tempt 18 made to trace

e~aboratel,

Ho at-

the consequences 01' Locket.

propertr tneorT on subsequent economic theorJ.3

.4
1

John Locke, !!! Basal concernin1l: the True Oridnal, Extent,.
and
.2t ~lVl1 Ggvll'!!P!fUt {Second TJtea1l1~O itVll lJgvernm,n1?).
ch. S":""an roperty. in '50 Treattfe. 01' iv 1 gvS!~nt, BvePlman 84. (W,. York, 1943),-PP. 1~9- 1."". "I All 8uaequent reterence. to the Second Treatise ,,111 be designated by ~

2

Se. this ohapter, pp. 8.10; ch. II, pp. 32-33, 38-39.

38e• this Chapter, PP. 11-13 tor a bri.t treatment 01' Locke'.
intluenoe on subsequent economic theorists.
1

2
Thus the th.sis is divided into tour chapters.

The second

and thlrd chapters are the core ot the thesi8, inasmuch a8 they
present Locke'S tneory ot property as he Intended it to operate
firat in the atate at nature, and then in civil society.

Chapter

Two ls there tore concerned wIth propert,J in the ltate ot nature;
Ohapter Three, wlth clvil property_

To the explanation ot the

various points ot Locket. doctrine in Ohapters Two and Three, is
joined a prel1m1nary critiCism, lometimes favorable, more otten
expre•• ing partial agreement and partial disagree.ent.

In Chapter

Pour, a mOre camplete and unified ana17sis and criticis. is presented, and an attempt 1s made to understand wbJ Locke neglected a
complete Itudy of civil property, particularly of the 80cial obligation. ot civil property.

Certain obvious ll.ltations in Locke's

theory are in tni. way better understood.
Looke, how.ver, was primarill a poll tical, not an economio,
In hi. own wordl, the Second !reatiae 1s "An Blsay

philo8opher.

concerning the 'rue Origlnal, Extent, and End at Clv11 Govern-

ment."4

AI foundation tor this the0rT ot civ!l government, Locke

also develops a theory of societ1, or ot the nature ot man al a
1001a1 being.

The theor7 ot property, therefore, is subordinated

to theae otner two oonald.ratiana, the nature ot man .s a aocial

4~,

ah. 1, seot. 1, p. I1S.

.3
and as a polltlcal belng.~

Accord1ng17 they a180 must be given

some attention In the followlng chapters.
ter Two is

~ererore

!he tirst part of Chap-

concerned with a description ot man in the

state ot nature, .a a locial but not a pollt1cal being.

The tirst

part ot Chapter Three describes man as a member ot political societ7.

The state ot nature 11 the setting or environment for the

origin ot propertlJ civil .ociety, the environment for ita fruition.
In the J:lemainde,. ot this introclucto17 chapter, the lignifi-

cance ot Locket. property theory 1s evaluated from .everal points

ot vi...

Plrst the importanoe ot Chapter Pi ve (" On Propert,.") to

the re.t ot the Second TreaH,.' i. discuased.

'.rhen oertain oon-

tempor&l7 vi ... on pJ'lOpert,. in Lockean Bngland are considered in
order to estlmate the intelleotual atmosphere in whlch Locket.
doctrine on property made ita initIal appearance.

Finall,.. same

Indioation 18 given ot tine intluenoe which his property theory exerted on later Brltish economlats, especially Adam SBdth.

All

the.e obaervatlons, however, are brierly made 81noe they are Intended merely .. s an introduction to the treatment of the theo17
itselt in Chapters Two and Three.

SRlchard McKeon comments: "The tundamental terms which lie,
trequently unexamined, behind the consideration ot propert, and
determine it. detinltlon, are terma descriptlve ot the nature ot
man and the nature ot his group organlaations."--Richard McKeon,
"The Development ot the Concept of Property in Political Phl10sophy," Bthica, XLVIII (Apri1c1938), 302.

"Propertf" In the Second lreat!"

1. sometlmes Interpreted

broadly, a. inoludlng "llfe, liberty, and estate.,,6

On the other

hand, 1t often signifie. simply the posses8ion ot materlal good•• 7
Furthermore, Locke aay. that every man has a "property" 1n his
own peraon and in hls own labor, a. the work ot his,h&nda. 8 Hence
the term propertl admits ot many interpretations in Locke's Second
Treatise.

The basic meaning ot propertl tor Locke, whieb give.

sub. tanc. to all the other.s, is that ot prgpr1wa, a La tin word
meaning one " .2S, trom whioh the English word proR!rtl is derlved.9

Hence und.r the notlon ot property &s being what Is onet.

own, Looke inolude. all the natural r1ght. ot man.

"But h.

(Locke) included 1n the general name 'property' every man'. tllte,
l1berty, and .ata'.,' that 1., tiDe whole ot his natural rignta .a
60,0 •• ch. 7, sect. 87, pp. 1$8.1$91 "Man ••• hath by nature a power not onl7 to pre ••rve hi. propertr-.that 1., hl. 11te,
11bertr,and eatate again.t the Injurie., etc • • • • " Se. also
ch. 9, •• ot. 12), PP. 179-180, "[A]nd it 1. not without reason
that he {:man In, the atate ot naturel •• ek. out and 18 willing to
jo1n in society with others who have alread7 united, or have a
mind to unite tor tbe mutual pre.ervation ot their liv.s, libertiea, and e •• at•• , whioh I call b.J the general name--property."

1 Ibid .. ch. S•• ect. 31, p.l)2, "But the chler matter of
propertj being now not the r.ru1t8 of the earth and the beaata that
sub8ist on It, but the earth It.elt, aa that eto • • • • "

8

Ibid., seot, 26, p. 130.

9.ebater's Hew Collegiate Dictionarl, based on W,bater'a New
Internationa! b&CiIonarl, 2nd ea. (!prlngtleld, Mas •• , r9~6), --p.

677.

5
a human being, and not simply bis land and goods."lO
This identification of property with all natural

rl~pts

in-

troduced contuaion into Locke's statements on property, but, In
tne opin10n ot most cr1tics, 1t added greatly to the importance of
his theory just1fying the natural right of property.

For tne jus-

titlcation ot property as a natural right then involved the Justit1cation of tn. entire syat.m ot natural r1ghts.

Specitically,

it, as Locke intended, the right to property 1n material goods belongaa to man independently of clvil sooiety, then the other natural rights, aubsumed under the term property, belong to him in the
same waJ.
r1ght ot

Again, I t government ex1sts to proteot th.e natural
prop.r~,

it also exists to proteot the other natural

right., and oannot intertere with their proper exeztoi.e.
I

SOl'

Protes-

George H. Sabine comment••
Thi. account ot property, though introduced almost casually, had a protound ettect on Locke'. whole soolal philoaophy. a. never aald, and almost certainly dld not bel1eva, that there was no natural right except P»OPerty.
frequently, however, he used "property" where he .....
to have meant any right, and aince p"party was the only
natuztal right whioh he examined at length, lt . s inevitable that It ahould stand out aa the typical and important right. In any case, he conceived all natural

r!f:~:a~bi~o~~sl!~:: :!cr::~e!n~'g~:;n!:n;=l!ay,

Aa

as

"property. It therefore, natural ri gh t8 can be regulated only to

10J. W. Gough, John Lock,', Politic!l fhl1olophY (Oxtord,
19$0), p. 85.
.
llaeorg. H. Sabin., ~ Bl.to£X ~ l~1t1g11 The0ll, reyi.ed

ad. (B.w York, 19$0), p. ~2~~

6
the extent that i. neoe•• &r7 to .ake etteotive the equally valid

ola1ma ot another peNon to the lame rights.
h _ another poiDt ot vin, Looke'a property theo!?, oontribu-

ted to .. tabli.b government by can••nt 1n hi. pol1ttoal philolo-

pbf.

Men who own property prior to their entering loclety and

government are e0Ol101110&11,. independent ot their neighbors.

Henoe

not thr'ough sub.enient tear

01'

theil' own oonaent. the,.

or join oivil 1001et1 anc.t aurrend.eJl

tOJ.Wlll

coeroion, but yoluntar117, through

aama ot their property by ••, ot taxatlon.

e1"lUllent

t.

ch~.t

In like manner, gov-

tuk 1n their e,.e• • ill be to .ecure the canCi1-

tiona neoe•• &r7 tor

~e.

aa indivldual. toenja,r aDd lnorea.e

thel. prope:-t,.

1'here can be 11 ttle doubt that It 1. Locke ts theol"'1 ot
property. and the prominent po.ition that it oooupies 1n
the tOHhont ot hi. polltical 171tem, which baa been
largely l'e.paa.lble tor the generally held vie. that h.
was •• aentiallJ and primarily an individua11st. Not
content, .1 l'UD7 contnok:r1an• •ere, wl1m a politioal
Uheol"7 whioh ...4. men exchange their natu.'rtal lIbert, tor
.eour1t7 and ppoteot1on, Locke, 1t 1. otten pointed out,
was oaNtul to Wist that propel't)" waa an inatltution
whioh, ao tar tJtOl'll owi:nB Its existenoe to olvU aoolet"
had _1.,,84 in the aMt. ot natu~e 1 belt, and. fie p~1Ile
task ot government
to pre••Pye 1t unhar.ed.

w..

Taxation la lawtul, but only wi th the con.ent ot the people,
81noe p~opert7 i. a natupal right. 13

120ougb , PP.

73-74.

130.6., ch. 11, •• ot. 140, p. 189' "[11']01' It arqone shall
ola1m a-poiel' to 1&7 and leV7 ~axe. on the people by hl. own authox-iif, anc1 without .uch conaent ot the people, he thereby !nvad•• tbe fundamental law ot property, and 8ubverts the end ot

government."

7
Leo Strausa claim. tor the theor7 of property a unique position in Looke's political thinking.

"Locke's doctrine ot proper-

ty, which i8 almost literally the central part ot his political
teaching, is certainly Its MOst characteristio part.

It diatin-

gulshea his political teaohing most clearly trom that ot Robbes
and froll the traditional teachings as well."14

Strauss earetully

points out that this singular position ot the property' theory
wlthin Locke'. Second

~reatia!

i8 not immediately evident trom a

study ot Chapter V ("On Property").

Locke was obliged to conceal

"the revolutionar7 character of' his doctrine" on property', because
in hia age moat people atlll adhered to the older vie. accordlng

to which the unlimited acqUisition ot wealth is unjust or morally
wrong. lS

!here tore , in stating hia doctrine, Locke had to in-

volve his meaning, and uae the phraseology ot the law ot nature,
Strauss, .!~al Right ~ 81storx (Chicago, Ill.,
Strau.~ reasoning behind the above statement i.
summarIzed thus. Locket. great etfort in the theory ot property'
was "to prove that the unl.imited, acquisition ot wealth is not unjust or morally wrong." In Locke'. day thia notion ran counter to
the "bIblical tradition" ot the people that avarioiousness or
greed is unjust or morally wrong. In addition, his property theorr, by ita emphasis on natural right. over natural dutles, oppoaed
tne traditlonal teaching. ot Thomaa Booker and Scholasticlsm that
dutle. firat ot all are derived tram natural law, not rly~ts.
Plnally. Locke's property theory distlnguishes him tram Hobbes In
that Locke furthers through the theor.y Ideas originally proposed
by Hobbe.. Since Locke make. man's acquisltive Insttncts the no~
of morality in property, he contirms and considerably advances
Hobbe.'a position that an ethical system ot natural rights based
on the Ego should supersede the older system ot natural duties
baaed on man's tinal end.

l4L.o

1953), p. 234.

15 Ibid., p. 246.

See a180 n. 11 above.

8

since the baoking of
ideas.

natu~al

law would holp to establish his new

Yet he did indicate the true oharacter of his

clearly enough. 16

doot~lne

interpretation of Locko's p~operty
theo~ will be handled more fully in Chapter J<'our. 17 Here we note
St~aussts

only the connection of the property t..'leory with the entire Second
Treatise, as indicated by Strauss.
Locke's readers, the adherents or the Hevolutionary SettleIllent ot 1688, noted sharply the implications of his property theory, slnce property considerations were such an important part of
their struggle for political ind.ependence.

J. W. Gough notes that

some of the major political disputes during the reigns of the Stuart monarchs had concerned fiscal questions, and these disputes
helped to make the sanctity of private property a political ax10m
to be defended to the uttermost against the pretensions of the
royal prerogative.

He concludes, "It is only to be expected,

16Ibid., pp. 246-247: "He (Locke] traced the introduction of

'larger possessions and a· right to them' to 'the desire of having
than man t needs or to an increase in • covetousness,' or to
'.imS2J! scgleratul Imbsmd1, evil concupiscence.' In the same vein
he speaks disparagingly of 'little pieces of yellow metal' and of
'sparklIng pebbles. t But he soon dr"ps those niaiser1es: the burden of his chapter on property is that covetousness uld concupiscence, fa~ frOtn being ossontially evil and foolish are, if properly channeled, eminently beneficial a.nd reasons h!., much more so
than 'exemplary cr~rity.t By building society on the 'low but
solid ground' of selfislmess or of oertain 'private vices,' one
w111 achieve much greater 'public benefits' than by fut1lely appealing to Virtue, which is by nature 'unendowed.' One must take
one's bear1ngs not by how men should 11ve but by how they do
11 ve."

mo~e

17See cb. IV, pp. 88-90.

9
tnererore, that a prote.aed apologia for the Revolution of 1688
ahould give great prominence to the inviolability of private property. n18
Property waa a rallylng-point, a revolutlonary weapon in
Lockean England.

Harrlngton had publlshed his treatla. on the

economic baals of politics, Oc.ana: "Harrington stood alone among
the politlcal writer. of his time 1n seeing that government Is det.rmined both 1n its atructure and ita working by underlying social and economic torces. • • • The underlying thought in HarringtOnts theory is that the form ot

govern~ent

which is permanently

posaible in a country depends upon the distribution of
.apecially property in land.

Whatever class owns a

p~operty,

preponder~ting

'balance' ot the land, say three parts 1n tour, must by sheer economic neoeasity command the power to control government. n19
Prudent men realized that Harrington had oonsidettably ovel.9played
the economio factor 1n polItical 11te,but the toroe ot h1s ideas
strongly appealed to the landed and merchant olaasea.

Thus Har-

rlngton's dootrine spread far and wlde 1n England before the reatoration of the monarohy under Charles II.20
In oppoaltion to the plutocratic tendenoles ot HarrIngton,

lS 00ugh , PP. 75-76.
19Sa bIne, p. 498. James Harrington, The Commonwealth of
Oce!BI, ed. Hen~ Morle7 (London, 1887)J rirs' publiahed, 1556.
2OwI11iam A. Dunning, A Hlatoi ot Poll tIcal '!'heories trom
Luther 12 Monteaquleu (New 'ork, 1 2S1, p. 248.
-

10
va~loua

democratic

aame t1me.

~.rol'll

movement.

"'1'8

atoot In England at the

One such gz-oup weN the LevelleN, who oampaignect tor

polltloal equality apart tram prlVileRa ba.ed on property.
Agains' the pr-evaI11ng vi. . that Parl1a\lfmt represented v.sted
tnteNata, the Levellel" olaimed that, "[I)t 18 the man, not the

Interest. that 1s subject to the law and hence it 1. the
not prop.rtf that mould be Npreaentett.,,21
were the ft.ue Lovellers

01'

.a

PI'Ope~t1

and

Another Nt... group

the Diggers., BYR'H aoolallsta who

sought pertect econODdo equa11ty.
fended

.aD

a natur-al right,

Unlike the Leveller. who de.
~. Dlsge~a

claimed common

OWIl.rahlp ot the land aDd 1 ta pl'oduo ta .a the "natural. a ta te ot

man. aU
'l'hua by the pnaaW'1 ot oonnlotlng v1ew. the average aeven.

teenth cent\U7 &l.gliahavm was toroed. to tora 8ame opinion on the
nature ot properttJ' and l'a pUrpoae in olvil aociet,.

Moreover,

tn. taot that propertf was widel, distributed In Bngland at that
t1me. and tbat property ctualltloatlana .el'e l"equil'8d tor IlUtf'ltap
m4 .I. t2l'tl ol1

tOl'

lI_ber.hip 1n Parliament_ 11kewlse contributed

2la.bine, P. 467.

Fol' a cOlIPlete treatment ot the Levellere
"Radicala and C__•
ntata" J alao Dunnina. ab. VII, "!beor!•• ot tmePur1tar1. Re'Volu-

aDd. Dlspra lIOVell8llta, of. Sabine, ah. XXIV,

tlon.-

22~

p.

tor the-nIii8r81

l • H. ~uot •• Wlnstanle", the ohier apologiat
!t9Bone
ought to ba lord. or landlords ovel' anoth-

er, but the earth Is f'ltae for' evaJ!'1 aon an4 daughter to live fit.a
upon.fI--Gerrard Winatanley. WorM. ad. Sabine (1920), p. 289.

to make

{JOeke

t.

u
reader. WtWlWil.ly propG~t,..m1nd.d. 23
SUl'~\\ll.d1ng

In th.. inslAnd of 1100 and altezt, tb.e h410
8$

thtt phtlosopb$JI'

1nelud~:

Pa..'chal

or

the Revolution naade !I.15 political theol'S.•• ,

his th30J7 ot Pr'Opel'ty, pl:'lito'loal11 unasaal1able.

!~uld.n

lJ1S8: ex-ltlcal17 a

theo~

or

civil

LocJcG had proposed,

u~nts

PW8cft8l. labo~.

weft • • •

unpl"otiuable:11aqtd.d.tlona

l'f8t"e

01'

No atte-lUPt _s mad. to ana-

propen"

lns wbat; to. . of PftP8n,-

torioal or!d.n

oo_unl". to pl.\l)llo qUfU"It,

1natl'utod with ngal'4

'-0

ttl. ll1..
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Yet the true utility of Lockets property theory to later economic and po11tical thought was uncovered in the latter half of
the eighteenth and in the nineteenth centuries.

Locke's oft-

repeated d1ctum that the end of government is the preservation ot
property had become an axiom of e1ghteenth century political theory.27

This induced the great olassical economist, ~dam Smith, to

decide that the need tor civil government is proportionate to the
acquilition ot valuable property, and that the protection of individual property is one ot the principal objects of government's
eXistenoe. 28

Lockets emphasis on labor as the origin of property

rights 1s likewise affirmed by Smith: "The property which everyman

has in his own labor, as it 1s the original foundation of all
other property, so it 1s the most sacred and inviolable."29
Finally the Lockean idea of labor as the source of value is also
developed by Smith. 30 Joseph Senumpeter, the great contemporary

27Qough , p. 85. n. 1. References in the Second Treatise to
the preservation of prop.~ty as the end of the state include:
ch. 1, sect. 31 p. 118; Ch. 9. sect. 124, p. 180; ch. 11, sect.
134, pp. 183-1~4.
28Adam 8mi th, An ;mauin iDa JiWl Bature .awl CaUial 2t .!bI.
~ ~ ~i~l. Bk.~ch. 1. pt. 2: ed. Routledge (London,
1893) .. p. 556: The acquisi tion of valuable and extensive propet-ty, therefore, necessarily requires the establishment of civil
government. Whet-e there i8 no propert1. or at least none that exceeds the value ot two ot- three dayst labor, civil government is
not 80 necessary."

29Ib14"

Bk. I, ch. 10, pt. 2, p. 96.

30__
Ib1d
~••,

r ,
0h • #

P.

25 •

1)

historian of economic theory summarizes Locke'. contribution to
economic theorT thus: "He contributed much not only to the theorT
of money. he also penetrated into the problem of value--from tne
point of view at the labor theory of value."3 1
31 Joaeph Schumpeter, ECfi9ili, I2ect~ .i.!l.Q M~thOd An Hlstorlcal Sketch trans. R. Arlaew or , ) . p.6. See a180
J'O'IUi
set1, A Hi.torl or Economic 'lhowmt CNew York, 19$3),
p. 89. Por an-aocoWlt orLockean influence on nineteenth centUl'Y
English soolali8m, aee aleo Thomaa I, Cook, '" Introduotion to Twg
%reatl." ~ gov'rDmlS' by John Locke" (New York, 1947), pp.
xxx'rl ..xxxv11.

r.

CHAPTER II
PROPER!!' Dl !HB S'1'A'l'E OF 1A'l'URB

Part One - Jfart In the State ot lfatUN

Look. <t•• or-lb•• the state or natUPe thus. "[AJ state

otpe~

reot tJ:tee4ca (to:r _n] to ordet- their actiona, and dlapose or
thelt- poa••• alO1l8 and persons as the7 think tlt, within the
bounda ot the law

or

n~ t~.

wi thou' ..ak1ng l.a ve 01' depending

upon the will or any othel' man,

A atate al.o of equa11t7, wbe:reln

all the poweIt and jurisd.iotlon 1. Nclprocal. no one having
tban aJ'10~. . . ·1

IRON

1O..e.eN he de.oribes the .... atate ot nature:

"Men living together aoooZ'41ng

'0 reaaon wl$bout .. oomaon superior

on .ax-ttl wl th aut:horl t1' to juclge betwec the. i . properl, tn•

ot nature •• 2

• ta t.

The Lookean atate ot nature Uleref"ore 1. 8001al, though not
poli tloal.

lien live together under tn. unuaual corull tlona ot oom-

ple. tJtee40m an4 pe:rteot flquallt7. both or which e11llf.nate

~e

poe.lblll., ot political government and regulated political 11te.
Looke'. view 01" natw.-al

1

IWl

0,0., ob, 2, ••ot,

4,

tberetON» •• ta h1m ott tp_ the
p. 118.

2Ib'~lj ob, ), a.ot. 19.

pp. 126-127.
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A~l ••

tote11an doctr1ne that the state 18 a natural institution, and man
naturally a po11tical animal. 3 St. Thomas A~uinas, among many
others, also upholds the th.eory that man 1s l?z nature a political,
a8 well as a sooial, being. 4 Richard I. Aaron comments: Hi.

[Locke'a] indiv1dual 1s artificial.
tend. to be conoe1ved

He

has no family ties.

He

a somewhat isolated being even when he
enters into social relations with others. ft5 !his interpretation
a8

ot Locke by Aaron is true, but with

~ualifica.tion.

In his treatment of the state of nature, Locke is laying the

foundationa for a theory of government limited by the consent of
the governed.

Conae~u.ntly

he abstracts trom secondary details to

concentrate exclusively on the persons in whom this power of con.ent to government directly re.ide.: in his d&7, indivIdual adult
male..

Even when treatIng of property, where family needs are

3S•• Aristotl., Ait1 9" Bk. I, ch. 2: lba Politic' ~ AE1atotl" trans. Well don London, 1883), p. 5. See al.o Ar1atotl.,
Ilcomachean Bth1oa, Bk. I, ab. 1. l!l!. BioeMean Ithie., trans.
lettAon (ton!on, 1908), p. ,.

lf

4Sanotl T.bomae Aquinatls, In 11c, Ethicorum, Bk. I, Leotio 1,
n; 4: "Sciendum est aute.. cum homo naturallter est animale aoclale, u~ote qu1 Indlget ad auam vitam multi. quae slb1 ipse solus
praeparare non poteat, consequena eat, quod homo naturaliter sIt
paraal1cujua multitudin1a, per ~uam praestetur sibi au:xl1ium ad
bene vi vendum. ft --Sa,nctl 'fhoma.• Aquina tis, aR
Omn1a, PAl'Dla edi.
tion, Musurgia Publishers (Wew York, 1949),
, 2.
Translation: The fact .that man 18 by nature a soolal animal, in so
far as he requires for his proper existenoe marq th1ngs whioh b.,
hi. own efforts he cannot provide for h1mself, ilasas a consequence the faot that man 1a des t.ined b7 na ture to form part of a
oommuni ty which makes a tull and cOI!q)lete l1fe possible f or him.

nI

5R1chard I. Aaron,

i.2!m. Locke, 2nd ad. (Oxford, 1955), p. 284
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paramount, Locke makes only passing references to the individual's
role as provider for a family. 6

Since it is the male pre-

eminently who labors to gather the fruits of the earth, cultivate
the land, etc., in him chiefly is placed the great foundation of
property.

Women and children presumably derive their property

rights from the prototype of the husband and father.

Actually,

Locke conceives of several societies intermediate between the individual in the state of nature and political society: "The first
society was between man and wife, which gave beRinning to that between parents and children, to which, in time, that hetween master
and servant cnme to be added.

And thouph all these

mi~ht,

and

commonly did, meet together, and make up but one family, • • • each
of these, or all together, came short of political society.,,1

6~,

5, sect. 28, p. 131; sect. 48, p. 140.
1 Ibid " ch. 1, sect. 11, pp. 154-155. Locke's doctrine here
ch.

is the same as Aristotle's in Bk. I, ch. 2 of the Politics with
this exception: Aristotle sees the domestio household as essentially incomplete and therefore only intermediate to the perfect
society, the state. Locke, given the same data, concludes that
men organize civil society out of personal convenience, not natural necessity. (C,G., ch. 8, sect, 95, pp. 164-165) Aristotle:
"In the first place, there must be a union of those who cannot exist without each other, for example, of male and female • • • • And
there must be a union of natural ruler and subject, that both may
be preserved. • • • Out of these two relationships between man and
woman, master Wid slave, the family first arises. But when several families are united and the assooiation aims at something more
than the supply of daily needs, then oomes into existence the village • • • • When several villages are united into a single community, perfect and large enough to be nearly or quite selfsufficing, the state comes into existence, orieinating in the bare
needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good
life." (Politics, Bk. I, ch. 2, pp. 2-5)
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The Loekean state of nature Is fta state of peaoe, goodwl11,
mutual assistanoe, and preservatlon. nS This notion of peaoeful
co-existanoe apart from polltical rule is the distingulshlng note
of the Lockean state of nature from the same state of nature as
conceived b,. !homaa Hobbe.:;;1n his treatise Lexiathy.

HoI' waa

thlt a chance occurrence, for Looke'a Second Treati.e, though

01-

tenllbl, designed to continue the retutation of Sir Robert Pl1.er's Patrlar9b1 begun in the ll£lt Tr,at&.e, waa actuallJ almed
at a retutation of Hobbe.'. theory of the atate. 9

The Hobbe.lan stat. of nature ls a condltion of unending war,
not mutual peace.

_en are naturally anti-aocial for the following

reaaon. "In the first place, I put for a general inclination of
all mankind a perpetuall and restlesse
er, that a..... th only in D.ath.

d •• lre

of Power atter pow-

And the cause of this is not al-

wa1. that a man hopes for a more intense delight than he has alread1 attained tOJ but because he cannot assure the power and
. .ana to llve well, whioh he hath present, without the acquisition

of more. ulO

Fear and inseourlt,. eventuall,. coerce men Into form-

ing a political soclet,., the sovereign ot whIch la given absolute

8 IbId"

ch. ), seot. 10, pp. 126.127.

9w• S. Carpenter, "Introduction to Two Treatilea ot Clvil
Government b,. Jonn Locke" (We. York, 192JT; p. x.
--

n,

l°'l'homu Hobbes, LeViath
Pt. I, eh. 111 !he Bnfl18h
fh1lf,oPher. !£m!. Bacon is!. !!t::, ed. Edwin Burtt-nrework, 1939),

P. 1

•
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control over his subjeots.

Hobbes is therefore a supporter of ab-

solute government and of positive law over natural right, inasmuch
as men entering civil society trom the state of nature relinquish
control over themselves entirely to the sovereign power. ll
Locke, the defender of natural rights and of limited constitutional monarchy, begins with the same premise as Hobbes, i.e.,
of a state ot nature antedating civil sooiety.

Yet if he is to

draw a theory of government the direct opposite of Hobbes's trom
the study of this pre-political state, he must change the essential disposition of "natural man" from evil and wanton aggressiveness to good and peaceableness.

Hence, though inconveniences

arise in the state of nature to hasten their decision, men are not
driven, but freely choose, to enter political lite.

With such a

measure ot freedom in their actions, they are able to establish a
constitutional regime. whioh will preserve as far as possible the
na~lral

rights which they had in the state ot nature by providing

an adequate and impartial enforcement of the law of nature.
W. T. Jones comments:
Thus, though both Hobbes and Locke use a strictly
utilitarian argument to justif1 their respeotive state
organizations, they reach radioally different conclusions about the kind of organizations which utili tar11
IbId" pt. II, c. 17: "I authorise and give up my right of
governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this
condition that thou give thy right to him and authorize all his
aotions in like manner. • • • This is the generation of that great
Leviathan, or rather (to speak more reverently) of that mortal
god, to which under the immortal God, we owe our peace and defense." (English Phil" p. 177)

I

I'
"

19
ian considerations can justify. Hobbes thinks that they
justity (and indeed make expedient) an absolute and unlimited monarch. Locke thinks that utility can justify
only a sovereign whose conduct is limited by the same
moral order in which his subjects share, whose sole raison d' ~'r. is to produce the various conveniences which
thOse sUbj;cts desire, and whose continuanoe as sovereign is conditional UPi~ his willingness and ability to
perform this function.
In the above quotation, attention is drawn not only to the
differences between Looke and Hobbes In theirolvil organIzations,
but also to their common ground of agreement, i.e., that states
are established not out of natural impulse, but for utilItarian
purposes.

Hence, on the one hand, Locke is in agreement with the

scholast1c tradItion that government is responsIble to the communIty under the moral law; yet, on the other hand, he agrees with
Hobbe. that government i. a utIlitarian device to further the private interests of Individual membera. ll
Though not a po11tical soaIety, the Lockean state ot nature
Is a society under law.

"The state of Bature has a law of Nature

to govern it, whieh obliges everyone; and reason, which is that
law, teaches all mankind who w1l1 but consult It, that being all
equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in hIs life,

II,

llw. T. Jones, Masters 2! Political Thought (New York, 1949),

156.

llSablne points out quite clearly how Locke is an incons1stent amalgam of the medieval tradition of government with its notion of the oommon good as the natural end of civil society and ot
Hobbes"s new individualism which stresses private interests in a
utilItarian society. (Sabine, pp. 524-525) See also ah. III,
Pp. 71-74 tor comments on Locke's sense of social responsibIlity.
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liberty, and possessions."14

The law of nature therefore confirms

that complete freedom and perfect equality which are essentia.l for
the state of nature.

The social force of the law, however, is

largely nega.tive, namely, that no one should interfere with another's activity.

Positive social action to assist one's neighbor,

or group activlty toward a common goal are not required by Locke
a8

part

or

the law of nature, except In the following rather vague

provlao: "Everyone, as he Is bound to preserve himself and not
qult his statlon wllfully, so by the 11ke reason, when his own
preservation comes not Into competition, ought he, as much as he
can, to preserve the rest of manklnd, and not unless It be to do
justice on an offender, take away or impair the 11fe, or what
tends to the preservation of the llfe, liberty, health, limbs, or
goods of' another. ttl$ Locke adds that "everyone has a right,·'
though not necessarily a duty, "to punish transgressors of that
law of I'lature to such a degree as may hlnder its violation. H16
Gough takes exception to the phrase, "When his own preservation comes not into competition"; he notes that Locke does not
consider the possibillty of conflict between publlc and prlvate
Interests except an the comparatively low level of selfpreservation.

14e.G ••

"But 'most ot the gigantic conflict. of wll1 in

ch, 2, aect.

6,

pp. 119-120.

l$Ibid.

16 Ibid,. sect. 1,

p. 120.
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man as a ratlonal belng.~19
Locke

.e~e

The contents ot the law of nature for

certaln objectlve rules of oonduct, and the general

method by whlch rules

we~e

deduced was "reason" speculating on the

rational nature of man.
Yet Locke intended more by the law of nature than Pollock Indicates.

He believed that God, as the Creator of man and

things, was the source of natural law.

ma~erlal

It was God's Will. there-

fore, that "no one should harm another in his lIfe, 11berty, and
possessIons," because "they are His property, whose workmanshlp
they are, made to laat durlng Hia, not one another's Pleasure. n20
Reason therefore retlecting on man as a creature ot God as well as
a ratlonal being determined the Lockean law of nature. 2l Locke 'a
difflculties with the law of nature lay in the applloatlon of reason to rationally evldent first principles of being and moralIty.
Hls epistemological theories given in the ESSay concerning Human
UDderatandlns eatablish him as a sensist, tor whom objeotive certitude for such principles is philosophically impossible. 22
19Sir Frederick Pollock, "Lockets Theo~ of the State,"
ceedings 2! the British Academz, I (1903-1904), 240.
20
~, ch, 2. sect, 6, pp. 119-120.

l£2-

218 • e alao Ibid., ch, 11, sect. 135, pp. 184-185 for the law
of nature as the expression of the Will of God.
22
See JOhn Locke! An ESinY cgnc,rning Human Understand1ng,
Sk. IV, ch, 3, aect. l:!he
sllah =sIloao~ers, edt Burtt, p.
327. Also Sk. II, oh. 1, sect. 5: EnslIsh --II., p. 249. No sya.
tem of natural law principles, wbien is not derived trom per ~
evident prino1ples or beins, can cla1m philosophical certitude.
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Yet

~

facto, both in the Essay concerning Human Understand-

ing and in his Essa;ys

the Law of Nature, Locke established a
natural law based on reason and sense experience.~')3 1~e arguments
.Q!!

given therein are based on causality, in particular the causality
required for the creation of rational beings.

'1'he existence of

men argues to the existence of a superior Rational Being as Creator.

In keeping with His Divine

'~nsdom ..

the Creator established

an end in life for human existence which becomes known to men as
the natural law.

Irhese arguments are sound, thoup.-,h lacking the

philosophical certitude and objectivity of a reduction to first
principles. 24
Elsewhere Locke postulated that an

~

Eriori system of ethical

principles could be established, in much the same way as a mathematical system is built up logically from postUlates and theorems. 25

Yet no ~ priori system of morality can be considered ade-

quate if the ideas of God and of man on which the system depends

23Ibid., Bk. IV, ch. 10: English Phil., pp. 360-364. Also
John Locke, Essays .2!!. .:!ill!. IJaw of Nature, IV: ed. W. von Leyden
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, ~r; pp. 151-159.
24 In these arguments, Locke defines reason as "the discursive
faculty of the mind which advances from things known to thines unknown and argues from one thing to another in a definite and fixed
order of propositions." To which he adds: liThe foundations, however, on which rests the whole of that knowledGe which reason
builds up and rai Jes as high as ~~eaven are the objects of senseexperience."--Essays 2!!.the Law of Nature, IV: ed. von Leyden,
p. 149.
25EsSaY, Bk. IV, ch. 3, sect. 18: £n011sh Phil., p. 334.

would be subjective to everyone.

For no objective hierarchy ot

essences ordered to a common end could be agreed upon by men who
form their ideas of God and spiritual things like the human soul
from

enlarging some of • • • their ideas received from sensation
and reflection.,,26
It

Equality 1n the state of nature demands for every man his
rights of l1fe, liherty, and property without hindrance from other
men. 27

To preserve these natural rights, i.e., to see to the pro-

per observance of the law of nature in onets regard, another right
must be allowed to men 1n the state of nature: the
transgressors of the law of nature.

ri~~t

to pun1sh

By the tact of complete

equality, every man has the right ot sanction, or the being executor of the law of nature for himself:
And that all men may be restrained from invading others'
rights, and from doing hurt to one another, and the law
of Nature be observed, wh1ch willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind, the execution of the law of Nature is in that state put into everyman's hands, whereby
everyone has a right to punish the transgressors of that
law to such a degree as may hinder ita violation • • • •
and if anyone in the state of Nature may punish another
for any evil he has done, every- one may do so. For in
that state of perfect equality, where naturally there i.
no superiority or jurisdiction of one over another, what
one may.do 1n prosecution28f that law, everyone must
needs have a right to do,

26 Ibid ••

Bk. II, ch. 23, sect, 33: English Phil., p. 305.

27c•a., ch. 2, sect. 6, PP. 119-120: nno one our)lt to harm
another in his life, lIberty, and possosaions."
28IbId "

ch. 3, sect. 19. PP. 126-127.

25
Such a position, that all men should be the executors ot the
law of nature tor themselves, is ha.zardous unless :men are quite
rational 1n hlleir dealings with one
"Men are never wholly rational.

anoth.~.

Yet, as Aaron notes,

And a manta rapac1ty and greed

m1ght lead hIm to action wh1ch 18 contrary to the law ot nature
and oontrary to 1"ea50n."29

Without hlgher authority to settle

dispute. among men 1n the state ot nature, a oonditlon, lf not ot
war, at least ot "preoarious peaoe" must prevail. 30 Looke h1maelf
admits that "olvil government 1. the proper remedy tor tho inconvenlences ot

atate ot nature, which must certainly be great
when men may be judges 1n their own c8s8.,,3 1 Thus we see that
~le

complete equalIty, whioh is the foundation of men's natural rignt&
in the atate or nature, i& tram another point of vicw one of the
major reasons why men abandoned the state of. nature for the protection and inequality of civil society,

The other characverlstic disposition of men 1n the state of
nature i. pertect freedom.

cense, rather,
order

~leir

p.~tect

What Locke intends

freedom is the

he~e

is not li-

~atlonal 11be~ty

of men to

act10ns and dispose ot their persona and posseSSions,

as they themselves think good,

"wit.~1n

the bound. of' the law of

29Aaron, p. 276.
30 6219 •
31e.G •• eh. 2, sect. 1), pp.

~I.

123-l~.
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nature. "32

Thus men in the state of nature :may do as they wish,

provided that they do not interfere with the equal rippts of
others to the same freedom,

Hane Kelsen believes that there is a

close connection between personal freedom and the right of private
property.

This opinion will be treated later in the chapter. 33

Critics speculate whether Locke intended the state of nature
as an historical reality or a oonvenient mental fiction,

From his

own words, it seems quite plain that the state of nature was, and
is, a living reality: "[Slince all princes and rulers of 'independent' governments all through the world are in a state of Nature,
it 1. plain the world never waa, nor never wlll be, wlthout numbers of men in that state."34

Locke argues that sovereign rulers

are in the 'state of nature toward one another because they have no
human superior or law other than the law of nature to bind their
relations,

Likewise two strangers, meeting in,the "wilds of Amer-

ica/tape in the state of nature toward on. another, though each
may belong to a political sooiety Inanother land. 35

Aliens with

respect to the legitimate authority of the land in whieh they are
temporarily residing are also in the state of nature. 36

32 Ib1d ., sect. 14,
33See pp. 36-37.

J4~,

p. 124.

ch, 2, sect.

14.

P.

124.

35 Ib1d • J see a1ao ch, 7, sect. 91,
36Ibldsl ch. 2, sect. 9, p. 121.

pp. 161-162.

Finally,
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everyone is ln the atate of

until by his own consent, he
beoome, a member ot 01vl1 aoclet1. 37
na~e

On tne other hand, Sir Prederlek Pollook declare. that Locke
was tOl'Ced to begin wi th the s ta te or na ture to answer Hobbes and
'llmer.

Yet for him as for the ,ehoolmen, It was a "pertectly

consclou, abatraotlon" rather than an attempt to trace the aotual
origin ot aoole'T.

"The question 18 what a man'. rights would be
in the abaenoe of anJ po,ltlve Inatitutlons."3 8 W. T. Jonel, how-

e.er. t.ela that Looke may have had a double intention: "[A]lthough tne contract theorl.ta may have well have believed in the
hiatorlclt,y ot a atat. ot Bature, they are on the whole not so
muob Interested 1n d•• cribing an hi.torical taot aa they are In
.a.erttng the existence ot a moral tact. • • • BJ aaying, tor instanoe, that in a atate ot lature, men are tree and equal, he
[Looke] 40.a not .e...17 mean that there waa a t1me In the palt
when men ..ere tre. and equal in tae t J he meana rather to a •• ert
that they ought to be tree and equal."39
state ot nature to be a

no~

Thu. Locke Intended the

for civil 8001ety. aa .ell as an hla-

tOl"ical taot.

1a

37~ .eot. S, p. 119. The matte~ of oonaent to authority

t~eaiid:fn

oh. III, PP.

54-00.

38p0110ok. p. 241. See al.o Sabine, p. $26. nIt the fiction
about a state ot nature be la1d aa1de, th1. can mean only one
th1ng, namely, that moral rule. are broader 1n the1r appl1oation
than the rule. ot positlve law and are val1d whether gove~nt.
obsel'Ve them or not."

39Jonea, pp. 163-164.

S••

alao Gough, pp. 29-30.

I
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Lockets problem here was how to domonatrate the natural priority' or the rights of the indivic:lual over those of the state.
!he conoept of the hIstorical state ot nature was a conventional
term In

s.vent.en~l

century political theory; moreover, it was a

convenIent apparatus for Indicating that moral sphere In whl4h the
indivIdual with ita rIghts was prior to the 8tate. 40

Locke could

have achIeved the same results with a metaphysical comparison at
the end of man with the natural end at the atate.

But he choee

the hIstorical approaCh perhaps because his senaist epiatemology

l.tt room tor doubt about the valIdity ot his metaphysical concluaIona.41 Yet diffIculties aroae trom his choice.

It was ques-

tionable how much a description of a primitive society of lsolated
indivlduals could influenoe the
rary civl11zation.

practio~.

ot a complex oontempo-

Locke solved this diffioulty by stipulating

that great numbers of men even in his day were stl11 in the state

ot nature. 42

'1'h1s solved the problem ot the contemporaI7 utilitl

of the state of natux-e) but opened up the further question ot ita
ult1mate atatu., h1.tox-ical realIty ox- mental fiction tor the
sake ot abatraot discue.ion, as mentioned above.

400ough, pp. 70-71. The basic &slIwnpt1on here 18 that Locke
wanted to establish constitutional government ba.ed on the conaent
or ~e people. S.e tni. Chapter, pp. 18-19. alao JOhn Looke,
"Pretace to Two Treati •• s ot Govemment," in WqrlSl (London, 1114),
II, 101.
41S8• n. 22, p. 22.

420r•

sup., p. 26.
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In bis analysis ot property in the state ot nature and In
civil society, Locke was almost exclusively occupied with the economic conditions ot the state ot nature, and the exercIse of the
right or property wIthin that state.

Perhaps Locke intended that

civil property regulations should be somehow influenced by state
of nature property institutions.

Yet, as we shall 8ee later, the

manner ot acquiring and disposing ot property was radically difterent in the two statea.

Part ot this transformation was effec-

ted by the introduction ot money, whioh will be described in the
tollowing ••ction atter an analysis ot the earlier state of nature
economlos.

r
Part Two -

Prop8~ty

In the State ot

Natu~e

Locke's juntltlaatlon ot private property as a natural right
whloh 1s derived tram the personal actlvlty ot the owner ls well
reasoned.

To be undera tood pl'operly. it should fira t be viewed in

ita ent1rety brietly. and then systematically oonsidered 1n ita
logical development.

!his w111 be

OU~

prooedure.

Looke's justification ot the right ot personal property in
the state of nature 1s thus summarised: God gave the earth with
its goOd8 to men in common.

Unless each man had the natural r1ght

to appropr1ate for h1mself certain things out of the common stock
tor hi. own use and oonsumpt1on. he would starve and God·s g1ft ot
the earth to men would be in va1n.

Bverr man haa a property in

his person and in his labor as the aotivity ot his person, "tne

work ot his hands."

To exeroise the natural right to property,

man uaes the speo1t10 tunotion ot hi8 labor and the usefulness to
himselt of tn. goods which he appropriates.
of their usefulness is wastage.
(1.e., apoil

o~

An acourate measure

Those material goods which wast.

are kept without purpos.) in a man'a possession,

are not useful to him, and hence not hi. property any more.

Man

has a title by his labor not only to oonsumer goods, but also to
produotive goods, o.g., land, to the extent that these goods are
a180 put to effective us. by the individual.

Land unused by one

man beoames automatically the potential property of

30

anothe~

who

31
would lay claim to It by the labor of fencing It 1n and cultivatlng It, etc.
In

property

tne appropriatlon ot goods, the equal rights of others to
limit an individual'. rIght tbat he may treely appro-

80

pl'iate onl,. tt.,bette thel'. Is enough and a8 good lett in common tor
otber•• "43

In the atate ot nature, however, this problem 18 of

mino!' importance because land 1. abundant and enough ot 1 t ls ot
unlform value.

Both in the ear17 ag •• ot the world, and, in

Looke'a own day, "In aome inland vaoant plaoea of Amerioa," a man
could appropriate all tne land he could u •• without harm to hla

ne1gbbora.44

Wlth the introduction

or

mone7, however, the abun-

dance ot available land beoome. ourtailed.

Thi. aapect ot Lock.'s

theory w111 be handled 1n the tinal aeotion ot thls ohapter and in
Ohaptel' Three.
theory

tOI'

The above suffioiently outllnea the property

the state at nature ,betore

and clarity ot

trea~t,

thia part

or

~.

use ot money.

POI'

e&8e

Chapter Two wl11 be dlvide4

into three .ections: tirat, property 1n perishable goods; then,
property in land, and tinally, the introduction at money.
A.

I

Property in Perlshable Goods

Locke'a atarting-poin' in hla fopmal treatment ot prop.rtf ls

430 ,6,.

ch.

S, ••ot. 26,

44 Ib14t •••ot. )6,

p.

p. 1)0.

l34.

r

.32
the pr1nc1ple that God gave the world to men 10 common. 45
in the seotion on

pl'Operty

HI. a1m

1s to show how individual men come to

have private property without violatlon ot that original cammon
grant, "and that wIthout any express campact of all the commone••• "4 6 In a tew words, thereforo, Locke assert. the Independence

ot hi. property tneorr tram othera ourrently in vogue.

Hl. ao-

knowledged opponent, 81r Hobert Filmar, held the opinlon that
kings, having their royal authority by right of successIon tram

Adam, the oommon father ot all. were 801e property owners wlthin
their atates.

God gave the world, acoording to Pllmer, to Adam

and his heir. in suoce.slon who would dl.tribute the property of
the kltlgdom to their subjeots tor us., but roetaln the ownership ot
the land in thelr own persons. 47

In beginning his treatment

ot

propert.1. Locke clai•• that it 1& not enough to point out the dif.
fioultle. in Filmer'. theory, whioh was th. wark ot the Flrlt
k!st,.!.: he l'l'1Ust establish his own theory, based on the supposi-

4S~lS.'

aect.

24,

p. 129.

46Ib1da

Robert Filmer, "Pretace to ~.or!a~loD' ~ Arl.tot •• •• E~ ~ Sll.
1n Pa,plareba and.
nth,r
~
Robt~l, ed. Peter La81eit(Oxtord, 19 9 , pp. 1 7-1~1
• tipat government in tn. world was
roonaroh1cal, 1n the father ot all tle8h. Adam being commanded to
multiply and people the earth, and to subdue It, and havlng dominion gl ven him over all ere. turea, was therebr the monarch ot the'
whole worldJ nane ot hi. posterity had any rlght to posse.8 anythlng, but b1 hl. grant or permi8sion, or b7 8uocess1on trom him.
the earth (.al th the P8alm1. t) ha ttl he gl ven to the children ot
men, whlch shows, the title come. tt-om the fatherhood."

47S1r

GSIC"

tion that God gave the world to all men, i.e., t
posterity without distinction. 48
Furthermore, Looke

indio~tes

that in his

private property "without any express compact ot all the common...
ers. 1t

By this phrase, he informs the reader that he will not

strictly follow the theories ot two previous natural law defenders

ot private property, Grotius andPufendorf.
./

These two held that

the individual possessed his property by a virtual oontract betwean himself and the other members of the community.49

For Locke

this oontract 1s superfluous, since, as he states later, man poaseases in hi. own person the great foundation of property. i.e.,
Its justitication, apart trom the consent ot others. SO

48C.G.,

oh. S, sect. 24, p. 129. See also John Locke, First
Treatis.-o1 Civil Government (An B8~l concernin~ Palse PrinoiI¢es), ch:-\ •• ecta. 29-40: in!Wo
eat!ses olivll Government,
eryman edition, PP. 21-29. Here tooke refutes Filmer's text
quoted above, on the original grant to Adam as proprietor ot the
whole world. In oh. 7. sects. 73-77, pp. $1-56: and in ch. 9,
sects. 8$-87, pp. 60-62, ~e further argues against the claim of
subsequent monarchs to dominion over land in their domains by inheritanoe from Adam.
49See Hugo Grotiu8, De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 19~);-Bk. !I, cS: 2, sect. 5, p;-fS9.
Also Samuel Putendort, De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo (Oxford: Clarendon Press, I9~Bk. IV, cS: 4, sect. 4. p.~.

a.

SO~, ch.
aect. 44. p. 1)8. Richard Schlatter suggests
that the pn~aae.without any exp~eas compact etc.," is primarily
a refutation ot Pilmer'. argument against Grotlu. and Putendort
that the man who held hi. estate from the king had greater security or posseasian than the man whose title waa baaed on the consent
of all men. Looke, by directly deriving property from the law of
nature. avoided Filmer's contention. S.e Richard Schlatter, Pr1.!!!!. Propertl (London, 1951), p. 1S3.
-
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nature is a state ot perfect freedom and complete equa11ty, wtth
no common superior among men; pos1t1ve commun1ty ot possess1ons,
on the other hand, Imp11es some torm of civil government to handle
the d1stribution 01' labor, profits, etc. 53
GrantIng this prem1se, Locke takes the seoond step in his
theory when he Ii:lYs: "God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath also given them reason to make use of it to the best advantage ot ltte and convenience."S4

Not authority, or the consent

ot men, but reason, i.e •• every man's private interpretation ot
the law ot nature, will be the controlling factor in the division

ot the community ot property.

'lAnd though all the truits it nat-

urally produces, and beasts it teeds, belong to mankind in oammon,
• • • yet being given tor the use 01' men, there must of necessity
be a means to appropriate them some way or other before they can
be ot any use, or at all beneticial, to any particular man."

This

ia the tirst and most fundamental justification of the natural
right ot private property.

"!he fruit or vension which nourishes

the wild Indian • • • must be his, and

80

hts, i.e., a part of him

53~, ah. ), sect. 19, pp. 126-121. Otto Gierke comments
that natural law phtlosophers in Locke's day generally acoepted
the original community ot possessiona as being negative: "Thinkers
atill retained the traditional assumption ot an original community
01' possessions, but while the Middle Ages had believed that this
oommunl0 ifleeeva had issued 1n a posit1ve system of jointownership, the Sohool of Natural Law 1nterpreted it as be1nf only
a communio ne;attva, • • • the entlre negation ot property. -Otto Glerke,atural Law and the Theo£Y of Sooietx, trans. Ernest
Barker (Cambridge, Ing., m4,J,P. 103. -

54 Ibid"

ch.

5,

sect. 2$, p. 129.

that another can no langeI' bave any

J'i~t

to it, before it can do

any good tox- the support of' his 'lite.""S
On the one hand, men clearly have need

ot

mate~ial

goods 1n

thIs lire far s.lf-preservation and "the best advantage or lit.
and convenlence. n $6

On tho other hand, material goods, though put

1n the world by God tw the use ot men, have no natupal ordination

to one man x-ather than a.nother.

lienee men must have a natuJ'al

right or private properv,y to approppiate what was previously com-

mon, i.e., unolaimed.

Hana Kelaen and others argue that the prim.

Itive act ot appropriation i. not an exeroia. ot tn. rIght ot private proper'.."

aumptlon.

but rather ot the right ot personal use and oon-

Concerning Looke'. argument tbat rruit or venison must

belong to an Indian berore he caD conaume 1t, Kel.en comments.

It standa to reason that this argll1Dent can pJ'oVe the
neoessity ot indivIdual property only in article. ot
tood which man Immediately needs ro~ hi. 8ubsistence,
tor it is only w1 th respeot to theae articles that excluaive disposition on tbe part ot the individual 1a
pequlred. But alnoe Looke wan_. to jus tI.t)' 1nd1 vldual
pt-opes-ty in gones-al f he doee not con t1nue to argue In
thia direction leadIng to an impasse. lie emphasizea
tbe speoific mean a by whioh man appropr1ates the artiole. ot food and by whlch be may appronr1ate other
things also. And th1s means 1. labor.~1
Kelaen interprets Lock. t • use ot need here as striot subsis.

S5 Ib1d •
S6Ib1d ,
S1aana Kela.n, "Foundations or Democracy," Ethios, LXV!
(October

1955), No.1, pt. 2, 87.

r

37

tence need only, not human needs in general, which extend far beyond the requirements of self-preservation.

Undoubtedly, Locke'.

example of the Indian and the venison lends some plausibility to
Kelsen's argument.

Yet elsewhere Locke indicates that, though be-

ginning with stark needs, he intended to expand the term to include all that man would tind useful. or even convenient, limited
of course by the avoidance of waste and the equal rights of
others. S8

Kelsen's second contention that labor alone, not need,

justifies property is 11kewise refuted. 59
"Though the earth and all inferior creaiJures be common to all
men, yet every man has a property in hi. own person.
has a right to but himself. ft6o
ment

1.8

This nobody

Aaron refers to the above state-

HI. very doubtful principle • • • according to the legal

58~, ch, $, sect. 25. p. 129: HGod who hath given the
world to men in common, hath alao given them reason to make use of
it to the best advantage of 11fe and oonvenience. The earth and
all that is therein is given to men for the support and comfort of
their being.- See alao Ibid" aeet. 33, pp. 132-133.
59Kelsen's main pOin~, for which the above remarks are introduo torr, is that property is to be justified as an exercise of
personal treedom. Beginning with the Lockean principle that "a
man's property is in his own person," Kelsen interprets this property to be man'. personal freedom. Per.onal labor and the fruit.
of one's labor are likewlse extenslons ot fr$edam and hence one's
property. The wsaImes8 of the theory Is that whIle property may
be justlfled aa an extension of personal freedom, all other rights
are likewise justifiable on the same basis. In any given situation then, no priority of property rights over other rights or
viee-versa can be established, since all are legitimate exprele
sions of personal freedom. See Kelsen, pp. 86-88 for the complete
development of this theory.

60 ~, Ch. 5, sect. 26, p. 130.

I
"

I',

)8
code of most countries. u6l
the following.

IUs reasons for that opinion aaybe

Pirst ot all, in legal terminology property is

usually considered in the striot sense as relating to external

Only analogously then does one have a property in one's
own person, as a being endovrod wi th natural rights. 62 Further-

goods.

more, in a oomplex legal society personal rights are closely restricted by social and legal duties to other citIzens and to the
community.

An individual is never the proprietor of his being in

an unrestricted sense, as Lockets statement might indioate at
first sle.,ht.
Is Locke's principle therefore limited in applioation to oondit10ns ot the state ot nature, where sooial relations are tew and
no common superior exi.ts to regulate men's activity for a oommon
good?

The answer perhaps 1s contained 1n the clause, "Though the

earth and all inferior oreatures be common to all men. nO)

Looke

is summarizing here witn reference to property hi. arguments in
the First Troatise against Filmer.

Filmer claimed for Adam and

his heirs 1n succeasion an absolute dominion over the whole earth,
both men and all interior oroatures.

In this way. Adam and his

heirs were sovereign lords of all men and sole proprietors

or

Na-

61 Aaron, p. 277, n. 2.
62See Pollock. P. 243: "[TJhe rights of every man to personal
safety and reputation and so forth, are not marketable, or transferable, and are wholiy distinct 1n k1nd from rights of property."

63£&.,

5,

26,

130.

011.
sect.
p.
L-________________________________________________________________
~

I
I

II,

III
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tu~.'a goods.64 Locke retutes Pllme~ b7 alao using the Old Teatament to ahow that Adam had not dominion

belngs by the same grant a. he had dOll1n1on
the 8uth. N6S

hi. tollo. J-ational

OV8X'

OV81'

Ullvlng things

ot

Moreovel'l, Locke prove. that Adam had no pl'llvate do-

ain10n over the goode or the earth, but a doa1n1on shaped in coa..
mon with the pest ot mank1nd. 66
property In h1a own person
men ts drawn

rz.o•. the

Locke' • • tatement that man bas a

I'll.,. thus be •

Flrs t Treati.e. the

bl'let l'esume ot two argu.ar~

is cOJ1llon to all

men, 8eoond1,., man, having a right ot, propert;r in hi. own person,
cannot be aubjeoted to the dom1n1on

o~

anImal

Thus Locke's principle need

01"

othel' intenor oreatU1'8"

another human being . like an

not be con.14ered a CQ4a of' rugged individualisM, but a
tlon ot the tun<1amental human dlgnl ty of

DlfUl,

reaS8811'-

I.e., his indl vidual

orientation to an Hnd beyond human, tinite purposes.
"Th. labour or his bod,. and the ,ol'k of' his handa we _,. aa,.
al'a properll hla. n67

pHlau.nrorthy.

Tn!s pl'lnciple i8 undoubtedly

t~e and

Bv81'1 man must own hie labol', since in DlviD. PI'O-

64o,e,ryat£9RI HDQQ Arll~9tllt. eto., pp_ 187-188. POl' tn.
polltloa dominion ot Adam and his heirs over otnar men, .e. alao
~a~~t.~ftk. b7 811' Bobert Fllmel'. in Pairiarft!, ~ ¥~.£ p2.1~19'1
fopka eto., 04. Laalett, III. p. S8.~ ••slett. notation ot
i)atrial"oha 18 In "Heada of Di.oour..... aocoNing to a ne. 0 ....
bridge vera ion ot the worK, not accord1ng to the chapter h.adings
In the Chl •••ll .ditIon, whiCh here would be.ch. 1, sect. 4.
6.$F'r.~ Artit&ll. ch. 4, ••eta. 21-28.
66 Ib1a., aects. 29~O, pp. 21-29.
070•0,. Ch. S. aect. 2S,

pp.

16~1.

p. 130.

II

I

40
Idence labor ls tae ordlnary means by whlch a man sustalna hlmself
and hls dependent..

A

wage.laborer owns hl. labor to the extent

that he i. entItled to a just compenaatiOD trom the employer tor

who.e benetl' he employed his labor.

me qUestlon here, ho.ever,

i. not 80 muoh over man'. rIght at property In hla labor, a8 rather hi. rlght of property In the .trects ot his labor, 1.8., mater1al goods whlob are external to hlm.elt.
What.oever then, he remove. out of the ltat. that Nature ha1)h provided and lett it in, he hath mixed hi.
labW with it, and jolned to it 80mething that ls hls
own, and thereby make. It hI. property. It beIng by
hlm removed trom tho common state Bature plaoed. it in,
t t ha t.h 07 this labott aometIling annexed to It that exclude. the common rlgh t ot other men. For thIs "labour"
being the unquestioned property of tho labourer, no man
but he can have .. rlg')lt to what that 1. once jolned tOt
at least wh.t:e there ls enough and as good lett in common
tor othetta. OO
Thus Looke evolved a natural pight theol'7 ot property troll
a ourloua oonjunotlon at older dootrines.
man bas a

~i8ht

To the baslc Idea that

to whatever goods he can use

ro~

preservation and

growth, Looke jo1ued the dootrlne 'Ghat labol' oreate. a tltle to
property in goods prevIously unola1med.

Th1s joint theory Looke

further modifled by hls deolaration tnat labor and Ita etrect. are
the leglt1mate expression

o~

human personalIty.

Property thus

come. to be owned under the doubletltl. ot labor-use and personal
tre.4011.69
68Ib1d ,

698 •• Cook, Introduction, p. xxvi.

Looke is sometimes oited in support of a theory that productive labor 1s the absolutely f1rst (primogonius) title to private
property.70

It seems doubtful whether Locke with his lack ,of

ph1losophioal preoision In the llse of terms. would,d1stinguish be ....
tween produotive labor and its ohlef rival, first oocupation, a8
the absolutely first title to property.

He used labor in the ge-

neric sense, meaning mants personal activity.

With regard to con-

sumer goods right at hand, man'a labor was an aet ot appropriation, or first oceupation.

But in consumer goods requiring pre-

paration before use, and in the appropriation of land through cultivation, the labor of man became productive labor, i.e., the
transformation of a natural good from its primitive state to a
more useful condition.

Such a diatinction in title. to property

would have considerably sharpened the accuracy of Locke'. property
theory in the state of nature, but especIally in civllsociety.7l

700ranted the natural and innate right of acquiring private
property 1n tne abstract,' it is also true that no property belongs
to anyone by nature. The juridical fact or circumstance by which
a person ca.ea to acquire property rIghts in a specified material
good 1s ca.lled 'his ti tlj to that pttoperty. 'lhere are original titles to property, by wh ch an individual is the first to acquire
actual ownership over a piece of property, and derived titles, by
which one receives property from a tormer owner, as in I~eritance
of a patrimony, etc. The questIon here is of original titles, and
specifioally of the absolutely first title which is presupposed by
the others.

11See ch. III, pp. 67-68. Actually first occupation must be

given the prior positIon as absolutely first title to property
over productive labor. Labor presumes prior occupation of the raw
material to be changed and thus made one's own. See Francis J.
Haas, !!n ~ Society, 2nd ad. (New York, 1952), p. 265.

I

I
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B.

Property in Land

F1*cm ownership ot consumer goods 1n the atate ot nature,
Looke prooeeds to mants ownership ot produotive goods. e.g•• land#
"But the chler nJAtt«u:' of property

.arun

~ing

now not the tpu1ts of the

and tne beasts that subsist on it, but tae earth itself, aa

that whioh takes in and. ofU":M.es with it all the rest, I think that
it 1s plain that pl"'Opertl' in that too i8 aoquiNd as the torme!'.

As much land as a man tl11s, plants, improves, oultivates, and can
use the produot ot, so much is his

aa it

ftH

pro~ert,..

He by' his labor does

enclose 1t trom the eommons .. lf 72 The heart ot the argu-

ment hape, as also 1n the case ot perishable goods, 1s the oon~

junction ot the right ot effective use with the oonoept ot pex-sonal. labol*'.

0n17 as muoh land

8.8

a man can use will become hls pro-

perty; and the t1tle through whloh he exerc1.es his natural rlgnt
over this pllU'tlcular plot 1s productive labor.1l Locke t a other
contention that a natural. right of pl'Opertl exists in land as the
source

or

other oonsumer gooda, 1. 11kewlao sound.

Human ex1s-

tence would. be very inseoure 1£ man could not provide for

tb.~ f"u-

tur. 117 appropriating property in land as well as in consumer
goods.

It 18 acoording to h1s rational nature, by- wb.1oh he dif.

ter. fi'om. all intel'ior
,F

d

O"a~8,

that uncitn." Divine Providence man

ft

720,G,t on. $, sect. 31, p. 132.
130 t.

sup •• p.

41.

I
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be master ot hls own acta and provide for tuture advantage a. well
.s present enjoTment. 74
The equality and pertect freedom of men in the state ot na.
ture, as well as the tact that God gave the earth to men In common, Indioate that the rights of others may aometim.s restrict individual property holdings.

Accordingly, Locke stipulates that

property in land and perishable good. is held subject to the condltlon that "there is enough artd as good left in common for
other•• "75

The clrcumstances ot the state ot nature were such

that thls general provlso was sufficient proteotlon against wanton
aggr~lon

on the rights ot others.

Much depended, however, on

the scarcity ot laborers and the retarded rural economy ot the
stat. ot nature.

It was not the aotive operatlon ot prlnciples ot

.oclal justloe whlch produced harmony among neighbor., but the
lack ot an ocoa810n tor d1sagreement.

W1th the growth ot the pop-

ulatlon, and espeolally wlth the introductlon ot money, the peaoefulness ot the state ot nature came to an end.
C.

The Introduotion ot Money

In the early stages ot the state of nature, eaoh laborer was

74Pope Leo XIII, Re~ Novarum (On the Cond1tlon ot Labor),
sects. 5-6: appendix to ~r,anlzat10n-or-the !oolal EiOn?!l
Oswald von Nell-Breunlng, s .. , trans. Kirnard W. Dempsey, .J.
(Ie. York, 1937), p. 368. Papal property theory .111 be consldered In ch. IV, pp. 77-84.

oy

75~, ch. 5, sect. 26, p.

130.

considered as an independent productive unit, who gathered and
reaped to sustain himself alone.
ted by Locke.

Family considerations were omit-

Furthermore, no indication is given how each man

provided for hi. clothing and shelter except by his own unaided
eftorts.

Even the ownership of land was justitied on the baais of

an immediate or .easonal provision of the basic toodstufts.

The

introduotion ot first-hand bartering, however, i.e., of one good
tor another, was a bil improvement in tbe .tate or nature economics for two reasons. 76

First it showed a growing sense of fore-

thought on the part of tne laborer to obtain goods which he needed
but could not easily produce by his own labor.

Secondly, and much

more important, barter revealed an incipient spirit of cooperation between

labor~r8

to provide tor one another's needs.

Increased trade ot this type eventually suggested an elementary
division ot labor and the beginnings ot an economic system. 77
Beginning with the earliest types of bartering, spreading and
developing concomitantly with the increase in trade, was a new el-

76 Ibid , sect. 46, p. 139. "And if he bartered away plums
that .ouid Eave rotted in a •• ek, tor nuts that would last good
for hi. eating a whole year, he did no injury; he wasted not the
common stook, destroyed no part ot the portion ot goods that be.
longed to other., as long as nothing perished uselessly etc • • • "
7710te the important influence of barter on the development
ot specialisation here: "Not unnecessarily it was noticed that
some people or same regions .ere especially ••11 adapted to produc1ng special things, and it was observed that people who required
many things could not specialize on a te. unless they could trade
the1r special1t1es for other products."-- Bruce Winton Knignt,
~onom12 Principle. !e Practice, revised ed. (He. York, 1942),
p.

41.
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ement in state of nature economics, which would revolutionize the
entire system--money.78
as follows.

Locke's account of the origin of money is

Speaking of the prudent householder who bartered nuts

for perishable plums, he says:
Again, if he would give his nuts for a piece of metal,
pleased with its color, or exchange his sheep for shells,
or wool for a sparkling pebble or a diamond, and keep
those by him all his life, he invaded not the right of
others, he might heap up as much ot these durable things
as he pleased; the exceeding of the bounds of his just
property not 17ing in the 1argenesa of his possession,
but the perishing of anTthing uso1essly in it.
And thus came in the use of money; some lasting
thing that men mIght keep without spoiling, and that,
by mut».al oonsent, men would take in exchange for the
truly useful but perishable supports of lIfe. 79
Locke thus traces the rise of money through the primitive desire for brightly colored metal objects or sparkling pebbles, baubles by which savages of all ages and climes have been fascinated.
!hence he concludes to the use of money, i.e., some durable good
that i. acceptable as a medium of exchange for truly useful consumer goods.

Elsewhere he adds that gold and silver, to which men

have agreed to give a value, prior to civil society became a standard medium of exchange for perishable goods. 80 The simplicity of

78 Ib1d ., p. 78: "Thus the significance of money lies in these
facts: that speoialization i8 vital to Bocial econOMY. that exchange is indispenaable to specialization. and that money is 'the
great instrument of exchange. t "

79e,G., ch. 5, aects. 46-47, pp. 139-140. Se. Lionel D.
Edler Economics, Prineleles and Problems, 2nd edt (New York,
1932J, P. S4S1or another aocount ot the origin of money.
80

~, ch.

5,

seot. 37, pp. 134-135.

I

46
Looke's theory oonceals a number of transition stages in whioh men
are eduoated to the use of money.

Some hierarohy of values must

be evolved and made generally acceptable to all men in a given
area, in order that these shiny objects may have more than subjective value as a medium of exchange. 8l Likewise, the use of gold
and silver in standard amounts as money indicates a high degree of
eoonomic progress prior to the establishment of oivil society,
though no mention of this is made by Looke.
As noted above, the introduction of money to the state of nature economics overturned the primitive oonditions originally described by Locke.

Trading boomed with tne aoceptanoe of a stan-

dard medium of exohange.

Tbinga of unequal value were exohange-

able, and the differenoe paid in money with it. generalized purcha8ing power tor goods at another time.

As a standard of value,

money provided a measurement in common terms for di8parate items,
e.g., live8took, jewelry,

e~o.

But, moat important of all, money

81The one distinguishing oharacteristic of money is its general exchangeability • • • • If an article passes freely from hand
to hand as a medium of exchange, if it is aocepted readily as a
matter of oourse payment of all debts and obligations, then that
article i8 money, no matter what its oolor, shape, size, or composition."--Edie, p. 543. He goes on to add that general aooeptability is a product of growth and evolution and tr~t money was a
gradual invention. The tirst articles used as money were commodities ot beauty or of physical necessity. "Shells were an early
form of money. They were used as ornaments because of their beauty, and the, were used as money because .heir beauty gave them
general acceptability as a means of payment." (Ibid., p. 545)
Other more useful articles used as primitive medIa of exohange
were: salt, skins, fUrs, etc. See also Charles Oide, PfinCiPles
2l Political Economy, 2nd English edition (London, 1903 , p. 213.
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did away with the restriction of wastage on the possessions of
men.

Gold and silver did not decay like perishable goods which

rotted unless consumed.

Unlike land, extra money in onets posses-

sion did not become common property for one in need to appropriate.

Money therefore was an easy way to accumulate extra property

without wastage.

Sufficient

muCh wider purchasing power.

acc~~lation

of money gave the owner

Thus money as a store of purchasing

power came to represellt additional real property in goods and
lands. 82 Money, for example, bought additional consumer goods for
which the possessor had not labored; money in sufficient quantity
bought extra land which the individual had not cultivated, and
hired laborers to work that land at a profit to al1. 83
God gave the world to all men, but especially "to the use of
the industrious and ratlona.l.,,84

Thus men of superior talent or

means became the pioneers in a rapidly expanding economy.

Grown

wealthy through increased lands and crop production. they ineuced
other men to give up :farm,ing and build mansions for them.

Some of

82Money has four basic functions: a) to serve as a medium of
payments or exchange of goods, b) as a measure of value for different types of goods, oJ as a standard of debt payments, and d)
as a store of value or purchasing power. See Knight. pp. 79-82.

83 To those temporarily without land or having little success
in the cultivation of their own fields, the luro of a fixed sum
and/or a share In the profits for working another's fields would
be irresistIble. In the beginning the landlord worked in the
fields with his helperCs] 80 as to retain the claim that his property rested on labor, not moneTa

84c.G"

ch.

5,

sect. 33, pp. 132-133.
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these were retained as meohanics and farmhands in the pay of the
master.

Women wero employed to weave fine clothing for the master

and his family, and again some were retained as permanent servants
of the household.

Freed from the obligations of servile work, the

lord and his sons found opportunity to travel.

Visits to other

areas in turn faoilitated the rapid interohange of goods and ideas.

New kinds of merchandise, new methods of farming, building,

primitive manufaoturing gained ciroulation, as travel and commerce
broke down the barriers between geographical localities. 85
New standards and values sprang up or were imported from
other localities.

Property no longer rested on the simple title

of personal labor alone, but the consent of men permitted exoess
accumulations of. lands and manufactures. 86

Slave labor, intro-

duced by trading or warfare, provided additional manpower for agrioulture and industry, but also oreated new social problems between free labor and slave labor.

F..ducation through tutors, and

later in schools, stimulated the demand for a stabilized, cultured
way of life; property disputes mounted, and irate claimants sought

85Charles Gide comments on early cammercial effort thus: "Exohange was as a matter of fact first practised among people and
regions far distant and different from eaoh other. Diversity of
products and customs resulted from diversity of natural environment." He notes also that the first merchants were wealthier individuals who had the means and leisure to travel: "At the beginning, moreover, merchants ?lore persons of great note, who were envied and feared, ranking higher than artisans and farme:t-8, and
constituting a veritable aristocracy."--Charles Gido, Prinoiples
2! Political Econamz, etc., pp. 201-202.

86~, ch. $, seot. $0, pp. 140-141.

49
arbitration on an impartial basis.

Thus civilized society was at

hand, but problems had arisen which could be solved only by ttl6
formation of civil government.

Hence to remedy "the inconvenien-

ces of the state of nature," civil society was born.B7

87 Ibid~. ch. 2, sect. 1), pp. 123-12.
4 See also ch. 9, sect.
123. PP. I7 -lBO, and ch. 11, sect. 136, p. lB6 for references to
contention in the state of nature prior to civil society.

CHAPTER III
PROPERTY IN THg S"tA'l'E OP SOCIETY

Part One • Man in Clvil 8001et1

Man leave the atate ot nature tor civil aoolet1 because of
tbr•• unaatiefied ne.d. J the need

at an e.tabllahed known law, the

need. of an 1aputlal judge to lnt.J'pJllet \hat law In partlcular

o1roumatance., and tinalll. tne need ot an ad.quate .anction or
pollee power to entorce ju.t decI8lon•• l The general end eP purpo.e unde1"111ng the aatlataotlon at t.l:le•• baaic needa 1. given by

Looke thus. -The great and chler end, tbeNtOl"e, ot men's unlting
into oommon.eal tha, and puttlng th. . . .1 ve. under government. 18

the preservatlon ot their property.n2

B.1 property. ot cour.e,

Looke understands all the natural rights ot 11to, liberty, .tc. 3
1

.

cfta,-

cb. 9, aect •• 124-126, p. 180.

e.G ••

Ch.

In somewhat similar
'erma,t. Thomas Aquinas t ••ches that human or poaitlve law exlats to deolare, det.paine, and urge, 1 ••• , eDrOPe., natural law,
8J declaration ot the law he meant tbe deduotion 01.' additlonal
precepts, e.peclal11 tho•• ot the third rank, fro. tn. firat prlnclple. ot natural law. Deter-mlnatlon ot natU1'al law meant to supplement the general pl'lnclple. by more particular principles. In
entorcing the law. since not all men can be led b1 re.son or admonition, coerclon must bo use4. S•• ~ fll!O!OId.~.f la-Ilao,
q. 9S. apt. 2 0 I <m,ra Off.1~ Parma iCr.etc. , I , t J . Also la
Dltll LIbERt B¥Qloo£MI,
• , leet. 12, XXI, 179.
2

'Ib".,

9, ••ot. 124,

.oot. 123, p.

p.

180.
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In

oth.~

words. Locke sees man In the state

ce~tain ~iqhta

~eater

to be able to enjoy his

freedom.

or

nature as giving up

~emainlng

rights with

Perfect freedom and complete equallty resulted

10 oonfu.lan and a state of precarious peace in the later atages

of the state ot' nature, e8peola11Y' atter the growth ot the population and the use ot money.

Henoe some rreedom waa 8urrendered to

civIl societY' ao that the freedom of other rights, especially the
rl~~t

ot private property, could be enJ01ed wltb seourity_
'1'0 sattar, the needs given above, man in the state ot nature

had to give up two "natural" powers when be entered civil societY"
the power ot oomplete •• If-determination w1 thin the law ot natUJ'>8,
and the power ot executIon ot the law of natu"_

By the first

power a man 11vlns 1n the state ot nature, Gould do whatever he
wished tort h1s own pl'e8orvation and that ot mank1nd, provlded he

obeyed the unwritten law ot nature, 1 ••• , the d1ctate. ot his own
r8880n.4

!hi. aame power 1n civil society he "give. up to be

ulated by law8 Dade by the sooletJ.

80

rec-

far forth as the proserva-

tlon ot hl.elf and the ~.st of that society shall require."'

The tirst power ls 11mlted, though not abrogated.

The second

power, that ot personal execution 01' the law at nature, Is entitte-

11 surrendered to clvll 8001e'Y.

Heno.torttl hia duty in this mat-

ter la "to assist the executive power 01' the aocietJ, a8 the law

4Ib1d .,

ch, 2, sect.

5Ib14 ., en. 9,

4.

PP. 118-119.

seot. 129, p. 181,

Alao sect.

6,

p. 119.
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th.~eot shall requlre."6
Yet, though to

ol~cumvent

ture, men surrender same ot

'1.

the limitations of' the state ot na-

thei~ pe~8onal

freedom to clv!l socle-

the power ot olvU govern:ment "can never be supposed to ex-

tend turther than the oommon good, hut 18 obliged to

8.cu~e

eveP,y-

anets property by providing against thoae three detects abovementioned .bloll make the State of llature

80 W18at.

~nd unea",."7

Within thla context. 1t m1ght seem that the oommon good 18 ;re.
strioted to the sum total of' all indiv1dual goode w1thin the

8tat•• 8 Yet ta1m••• to Locke demands that the a1m or the Two
~. . tlsel ~

01v&1

Gov~ent

pretatlon ot part10ular details.
stated in the

tt~etaceJ tt

-

be kept 1n m1nd to govern the InterLocke's primary intentton, as

was to establish const1tutional govern-

ment based on the conaent of the people .. 9

One ot the na tUl'lal

rIght. whioh he cought to protect was the sanctity of' indivIdual

property againat arbi t1"&1'1 state Interference. 10

Consequently. he

6 Ibidr.. , aect. 130, p. 181.
7~ldt' .ecta. 12), 124, pp. 179-180.
8Bdmund Wh1take1", A H1M01"l ot §gOllomlo Idea~ (tlew York,
1943), p. 43 I "The good-olgtand, accordIng toocke, waa the
aum of the separate goods or objectIve. of the individuals who
.ere ..socia ted together to form the Engllsh nation • • • • Whatever the men .ho campo.ed societ,. wanted, by that f'act becQme the
aoclal good."
.

9Locke,\lory eto., I, 101.

10ct• the numerous references to ,. the pre.erva tion of property" a8 the cbl.r end tor wh10h men enter Clvi1 "oc,etYI .2..t.!!.t..
cb. 1, sect. ), p. 118, eh. 8, .ect. 95, PP. 164-105 etc.
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was naturally led to curtaIl the activIty of the state to bare essentials, 1.e., the preserva.tion ot law and ordor, and the en-

foroement by publI0 authority of oontractual agreements among private indivIduals.

A aomplete notion of the oo.mmon good should in-

clude the demands ot 80cial, as well as commutatIve, justice; the
rl,~ht.

of the members ot a eonmnmlt1 preoisely as members should

be safeguarded.

All should be insured the opportunIty of acquir-

ing a suffioiency of material goods and other benefit. ot 80elal

organlzat;lon.

Fut-tb.ermore, oertain publio good "orks should be

undertaken by the elvil authority, whoJ:'e prIvate InItiatIve may be
Ineftect1ve. or even Injurious to the average citizen, e.g., pub110 health facilitIes, postal servIce, etc. 11 Yet, however linitod

Ii

state's authority -1 be. it fosters a

~~e prese~tIon

tice.

or

law and

ordo~

on

th~

OOrorJ'lon

good simply by

level of oommutative jus-

Hence, Locke'S civil society possessed a real, though lnad-

equate, common good whloh existed for all the oitlzens alike.
Looke 1. halled aa the "ohamplon ot individualism," partly
because he set as narrow l1mits

a8

possible to the state'. power.

but more justly becau8e be l"8cognized the tundamental trutb that

"government 18

all

instrument to be used tor the good of indlvld-

llFt-anola J. Haas indicate. the narrow limite allowed for
govol"'nment Intervention in private property thus: "Generally
speaking, .eltare 1a prORoted beat by allowlng the wIdest margIn
ot freedom to prIvate 1nItlatlv&, and acoordingly. the state ahall
lntel"vene onl1 when private 1nitiative has 01ear11 fal1ed, and especially when It has become a souroe or InjustIce to the communlty.fl._Pranc!. J. Haas, !In. and Soc&eltX, 2nd ed. (new York, 19$2),
p.

257.

uals.

-lb. state 18 made for

the Individual and not tn. individual

tor the at8te."12
In

~ock.'.

opinion, civil society originates in a formal,

volunt817 compact between equals to establish a community.

Men being • • • b7 na tuz-e all tz-e., equal. and Inde.
pendent, no one can be put out of this eatate and sub.
Jected to the political power ot another without hia
own conaent. The only wal by which &n1 one dlve.t.
hi. .elt of hi. natural liberty and puts on the bonds ot
civl1 .001ety 1s by agreeing with other men to join and
unite into a oommunlty tor their oomtoz-table, sate, and
peaoeable living one amongst another, in a seoure enjarmont ot their propertle., and a greater .ecurity
againat any tbat are not ot It. 13
Nor Is it sut.f'lclent to establlsh such a voluntaI7 covenant

once whereby clvil aoclety exlsts botn for the orlginal constituents and tor future generations.

Since the state of nature is

that atate ?blch "all men are naturally in, tt14 tOl"!al voluntaro)"
conaent la neo8.81l17 for every man re!tching "the age of dlscre-

tlon" to abandon the stat. of nature and embraoe clvil 8001ety_
Locke apeaks ot t01"lD8l. consent as the "on17 way" by wh1ch man can

.nte~ olvil soo1et,..lS

In ••where he S&r8, "a ch1ld 1a born a 8ub.

ject of no countrr or gov.~t."16

12Aaron, P. 286.

'lbS?\IgQt, p. 215.

llc.o ••
14 Ib1d "

S.e alao Jon•• , !astlrl 2! Pal1tlgal

ch, 8, ••ct.
ch. 2, .ect.

95,

4,

PP. 164-165.
p. 118.

lSIbld" ch. 8, aect. 99, p. 166.
16Ib1d, • •80t. 118, P. 177.
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As TJoClt6 h1mnalf implies,

1:10St

pGo;:;le did. not wholly- oono'fll'

w1th him in this .-tte1'l of oonsent to goveztn.rrl$nt. 11 They believed
~at

thaT

oltizens ot the country in Which ths7

we~e nat~117

:Wo," bol'n. altho1l$b there was some unoerta1nty about oltll1fma hom
in fOHign lands.

Locke ttlKes this llI01"Ct unusual 81 tua. tlon o£

birth in • to".!gn land (·Xf a subject of

F..n~laM

heve a child bJ

an EDgllsbwoman tn Fl'tmoe, Whose subJeot 18 hG?tt1 8)
exe..mp1e of tho

nat~

88

a t;ypleal

11ben,. whioh all !':len enjo1 tochoon th.lz.-

cOlmlOnwea.ltb lnatead of' being bound by the cholee of their rathea-.
P1'Opel"'1.

b.ow¥.~,

••%'V"a to keep aona withln the

of 'helt' t'atherfa cbol"_

jeot to the

due",

gov~$nt

AU Pl'Opert7 wIthin the "a.ht 1s 8W>-

Juv1.d:totlon of the gOVorr.nt, 'OMe the olt1-

aen. 'w1th tbe1l' po•••saloll. have -toztmal17 ent.Hd clvll aoolety.19
Ch11~n

ot "ttl.ema, it th.,. wl.sh to lnhel!'lt the land of thei.

fathel', must u" the

pl'Ope~

and alao eJIblta•• thell' rather t " cltl ••nahlp.20

17ru.t." aeot. UT,

laaw..

aG.$_

P.

US, ,.

w. of that; country.

8ubjoot to the l ..

Aliena living

116.
111.

19D1S... aeot. 120,. P. 1781 fta, the $&me Eu,t. tlleHtO.-.,
wbe:rebt UJ.1 one un! ttl. hle perton. which .~l$ betoX'G: t%"$.8. to 4U11'
cOlt1l'1Onftalth, b)" the __ he unites Me pcuusefud.ona, wh1ch ON
befope tNe, to it al.o, and tho,. bGoo_. both of thea, pGrson and
poe.e.alon., .aubjeot to the govo~nt and dom1n1on of that ool'ltmOnwealth ..a long as It hath a belng.tf
20W4t ••et. 111,. p. 176. tf ['1.' lb. eon oannet o:vdl~ly .'!)III
30)" the poe.td.ona of llJ.$ tathep but under the same te~ his 1:....
tho" d1d, OJ' beeomng a ~r ot the aocle~lt wh$.rGtv he put.
~=~"pN8~tl)" und.$X" th. ZQvernment he t1l14a tho" estab-

I:
i

"

II

I':
1:1

within the state may enjoy the use of property aocording to the
laws of the commonwealth.
,

They are free, moreover, to leave

~e

state and live elsewhere, though "by donation, sale, or otherwise," they must rid themselves of ownersh1p of land in the state
which they are leaving. 21
Onoe formal oonsent is eiven to become a member ot a civil
sooiety, the oitizen is bound to remain a subjeot of that sooiety
until the government is dissolved, e.g., by foreign oonqueat or
internal revolution: dWhereas he that has once, by aotual agreement and any express declaration, given his consent to be of any
commonwealth, is perpetually and indispensably obliged to be, and
remain unalterably a subject to it, and can never be again in the
11bert,y of the state of nature, unless by any calamity the government he was under comes to be dissoived. n22 The right of revolution from an unjust government Locke allows to the majOrity.23
Not everyone, however, living within the state is formally a
citizen, though all within its boundaries, even over-night travelera, must obey its laws, giving a form of tacit consent:
And to this I sal, that every man that bath any posseslion or enjoyment ot 8DJ part of the dominionl of &n7

21 Ib1d., sect. 21, p. 178.
22 lb1d ,

23~, oh. 19, .eot, 233, p. 236: "[T]h1s therefore ia the
privilege-o? the people in general above what any private person
hath I That particular men are allowed • • • to have no other reme.
dy but patience, but the body ot the people may, with reapect, reaiat intolerable tyranny, • • ."
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government doth hereby give hls taoit oonsent, and is
.s tar forth obliged to obedience to the law. of that
government, durIng such enjoyment, a~ anyone under It,
whether this hl. possesslon be of land to him and hIs
heira torever, or a lodging only for a week; or whether it be barely traveling freely on the .highway; and
in erfect, it reaches as far as the ve~ beingApf any
one within the territories of that government.at.
Locke fa dootrine of consent to government 1s contusing because it was

80

much at varianoe with acoepted praotice and bellet

In his own day, and also in more modern times.

PerhaPs, as Gough.

claims, this ve'1!1 incongruIty with contemporary praotice 1s a
"striking teattmony to the seriousness ot Locke'. beliet in the
prinoiple ot consent. n25 Yet, it taoit consent for Locke meant .a
little as

~aical

presence within .. oommunity, then the concept

or formal voluntary consent to authori tJ in his philosophy becomes

vague alao.
no

Looke, however, 18 certainl,. correct in stating that

~overnment

has a right to exist, no ruler a rlf¢lt to govern,

except with the consent of the oommunlty.26

Rule

by majority i8 the

method adopted bY' Looke

1"01"

the gov-

ernment ot olvll soo1ety:'
POI', when any number" ot men ha vo, by the consent of
every indlvidual, made a community, they have thereby made
tha t communi
one body, with&- pow a... to aCIt as one body,
which ls omf by the will and determination of the
majori t l. For that wblch acta all7 oommunity, being onl,.

t,.

Z4 Ib1d •• on. 8,

.eot. 119, p. 177.

2SGough , p. 66.

26Jones • pp. 17J.-175: nNo matter how long or how oompletel,
one man aotually exero!ses power over others he 1s never moralll
justified in doing 80 unless they oonsent to hie author1ty."
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the oonsent of tho individuals of it, and it being one
body, must move one way, it is neoessa.ry that the body
should move tha t way wh! thel' tIle grell tel' fOl'ce oaI'rios
1 t, whioh Is the OOllSOllt of the majorl ty, or else 1 t 1s
impossible it should not or oontinue one body. one oommunity, whioh the oonsent or every individual that united into it agreed tl~t it should; and so every one is
bound by that consent to be oonoluded by tho maJority.27
In England. by Locl;e t 8 timo, t.1-te principle of legislation by

majority-deoision in

Parlla~Gnt

oaI"r1ed

that Loc!:e Hud others considered It

D.

80

much tradition with it

"na.tural n procadu..,.28

Locke qui ta l"easonably thcr"Gt"'or6 concluded that r:mJo:rlty-declsion
WilD

nocessar'lJ to save a oOml':'lunlty from complete oonfusion and ul-

ttmate dissolution.
~

Though porhaps duo aore to fnulty wording

anyth1ng else, this "moonanloal ooncopt1on" of society drawn

up by Locke, wherein the greater tOl"oe must always provail, 18
Justly ol"itlo1zed by later writers.

A. Sabino points out, "Older

theol"loa ot popular sovere1gnty. suoh ae Mar.l11o's, had oommonl1
held that the 'prevailing part' o.f

Ii

quality as well as for quantlty."29

oommuni ty may be welghted for
In other words, the t an1 g&:

1!1!1 ot the o0tll!1Un1 ty deservos to be 1nolucled in the

tor the purpose ot determinIng legislation.

a

lor 111£1.

In Lockets taeory,

too much emphaal. i. plaoed on sheer numerical superIority.
PI

27 e,G"

oh. 8 t

• •ot.

96,

p .•

165.

2850• Gough, p. 63. Gough el ••where suggests that Locke '.
general alm 1n the, Treat! ••s was to juat!f7 exlsting gove1"l11'J1en'
1nat!tut!on., among th. . maJ91'1ty-J.'lIUle. Se. Gough, PP. 71-12.
Se. also ch. IV, P. 90, n. 44.

29sablne, pp. 533-534.
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Locke ha.d perhaps tttoo sanguine a belief' in the reasonableness of mankind."3 0

Henoe he would never doubt that a numerical

majority would likewise be a rational majority.
good of all and not their own interests.

p.~

seekin~

the common

facto, however, nu-

merioal superiority is no guarantee of fair legislation in itself.
but only when it is coupled with a rational consideration of the
issues and a sympathy for the interests of all parties.)l
In Locke's own theory. the dootrine of majority-rule shows a
further development in his ooncept of personal consent.
mally entex- oi vil society only by their own consent.

Men for-

Art er,Yard s ,

however, their consent means not acceptance individually of each
measure proposed, but oonsent to the will of the majority: "[A]nd
80

every one is bound by that consent (to government] t,o be con-

cluded by the majority."32

Putendor!' also said that majority-

decls10ns are binding on the community, the reason being that one
300ough, p. 92. Wl1~more Kendall disousse. this point at
some length in "John Locke and the Doctrine of Majority-Rule,"
IllInOis StudIes !n!B! Social Science•• XXVI (194l), 134-13$.
31WI1liam J. Kenealy S.J •• "The Legal Profession and Segregation," Social Order VI [OaSe, IXl (Deoember 1956). 484: II [B)ecause the essence of liberty is the freedom to exeroise individual
and equal personal rights and because voting majorities are a.ble
and quick to vindicate their own rights, true and effective democra.cy must consist in minority ri~~ts under majority rule. But
never in history has there been, and never in ~~e future can there
be, minority rights under majority rule unless the majority repu-diates the blasphemy that numbers make truth and that might ma.kes
right; unless the majority has the intelligence and good-will to
subordinate will to reason and to subjugate prejudice to judgment."

32~, ch. 8. seot. 96, p. 165.

Part Two - Clv!l Propert,y
Locke began his study ot property with a desoription or primitive man in the state of nature, appropriating eaCh day what he
needed from Ha tW'e '. vas t s torehouae.

As an ind1 vidual consumer,

and produoer trom the 80i1, ot Nature's good8, he owned enough

land to produce the good8 needed for oPdinary sub.istence, but
l1ttle more.

Then with the chance introduction ot money, tirst as

bri,,h t11 oolored • tones, and then as

It

standard medium ot: ex-

ohange, the economio system was revolutIonized.

Material wealth

became a goal to be aOhieved, a8 industrious men were able to acquire a surplus of oonsumer goods and land-holdings beyond the
power ot indvidual cultivation.

Duzwable goods also, such a8 met-

ala, preoloua atonea, crude manufactures, were another Bource ot
wealth whioh able men read11y aoqulred. J4 All thIs excesa wealth
waa dul,. valIdated by the consent ot men.

Eventually the problema

connected with growth in population, scarcity ot land, and Inor.... 1n mate!'!al wealth, neoe.8itated the oreat1on ot clv11

gOY.

ernment to p~ea.~v. law and order. lS
•

.34c,a" ch, S, aect. 48,

p.

140.

l>Ibld •• aect. 38, P. 135: "But as familles inoreased and induatr'7 enlarged their ,tocks, thtdr poseesalona enlarged wIth the
need ot the., • • • and then, by oon.ent, they came in time to set
out the bound. ot thel~ distInct teprltorl •• , •• I"
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'rhe economio differences between civil society and the s ta te
of nature as Locke first conceived it were considerable.
of a primi ti ve economy in

w:~ch

Instead

overy laborer su;::>plied all the ne-

cessities of l1fe for himself and his famIly, in civil society a
marked division of labor had grown up.

Peaceful trade and com-

meroe made it possible for men to specialize in their work,

8.S

carpenters, shoeMakers, tool-makers, etc; contrarily, increased
specialization increased f'urthor trade. 36

With the standardized

money which the civil government supported, tradesmen sold their
wares for a definite price, and later bought in the marketplace
foodstuffs or the durable $':,oods of' other craftsmen.

l'hus men came

to realize that by this indirect method of securing the goods
which they wantod for their own constlr.lption, they actually obtailled more of those goods than if t..'"ley labored directly in the
fields or over the forge for them.
Marketplaces, as the centers of economic activity, rapidly
expanded into towns and, where the location was apt, into oities.

pa~\llel exists betwe~n Locke's early oivil sooiety
and various sta~es of medieval economy, especially in the northern
part of Westo~n ~urope. Edie comments thus on the interaction of
specialization and trade: t1(MJen we.re beginning in large numbers
to produce thin~s not for the~.r own consumption, but for the consumption of others. frhen, of course, came exchange, and greatly
increased trade."--(gdIe, Eoonomics, Principles !!.US. Problems, p.
43). N.B.: In the followin~ footnotes we will continue to exemplify our theory BS to the effects of money on oivil society by
references to actual occurrences in medieval economic development.
In this way, we will gradually prOsf;nt a picture of the background
and current economic statuB of ~estorn Surope, and especIally hugland, in the seventeenth century when Locke was writin~~ his theory
of property.
36Some

Yet town 11te was dependent upon the hinterland about it tor roodstutfs, and alao raw materials, e.g., akins, metals, timber, etc.,
for the developaent ot town building and manufaoturing.

Henoe

there was much tI'avel between town and country weekly, even daily.37

To make traveling easier and to get perishables to market

taster, publio roads woro buIlt, and bridges erected to span wa-

terways.

Evon befara the advent of sate roads, oaravans ot mer-

ohants pushed .t'urther into the oount1"7 area and made business con-

taots with other towns and trading oenters. 38
st~cted

to

US8 ~~e

Vessels weN con-

rIvers, lakes, and aeaa aa additional media of

oommunioation between localities.

Thus local commerce gradually

expanded into regional, national. even international tradIng. 39

J7~,f.1V1n M. Knight, Egono~Q HI,tga; 2t kORt l.2 lb!t l&l.2t.
.iW! !tJ.4dl,' As'. (N•• York, 192, p. 20S. Alao Edi8, PP. 43-44.
36Melvln Knight, pp. 203-204.

39g • L1i8on comments on the extent ot English medIeval com-

meroe thua: The medieval trade routes ran in four direotioo ••
ane led to Calais. Another oonneoted this country with t.lle Netherlanda (Plandera, Holland, etc.) whoe. markets served a vast hin-

terland stretohlng to the shore. or the Mediterranean. The th1rd
pro v1 ded the link with northern Europe (Scand!navia and Prussia)
and roached as tar as Iceland. !he fourth was the direct sea pa.ssap;e to southern Europe (Gascony and Italy).
!he oommodities whioh were handled in foreign trade cove~d
an extenaive range. The _in importt was wine furnished by {lasoo1'qj other Frenoh imports Inoludod woad foll' dyeing. salt and atone.
~e Netherlands sent herrings, linen cloth, and tPlandera tIl•• ,'
while Spain supplied woel. 011, leather, and iron. The Hansard.
brought oom, shipbuilding matoriala (timber, pitch, and tar),
wax, gold, and pepper; and the great galle78 ot Venice and FlOl"-

enoe .ere 'well ladonad with thing. ot oomplaoence'--coatly aplces
tram tbe east, ••,et wlnea and extravagant 'trifles.'-•• B. Lip.on. ll!!. Gl!9!3?h .at &l&llah Sgg,-,t:y; (B•• York, 19$0), p. 65.

A constantly gr-ollinr" variety ot goods became availablo.

The

neCeasities of lIfe were commonplaoe items, as town$men and far-

mers alike olamored for hiWl quality tools, and other utilities.
Coatly luxurie8 too, spices,
.ere 1n demand. 40

per!~tmes,

expensIve clothing, etc.,

Pres.ed ~J competition from outside manuractur-

ers, local oraftsmen copied the goods which oommerce brought In,
soon d1800vering
cneaply.

t}~t

they could make many ot them better and more

Aa the volume of goods became larger and more varied,

and the manufaoturing teclUllquea more elaborate, further specialization within the oratt. took place.

Por example, one oraftsman

ooncentrated on one of many different kinds ot woolen cloth, or
handled only one of aeveral dlatlnct operations, such a8 spinning,
w.aving, or dye1ng.41 !hua domestic produotion of durable goode
moved into public shops and became manufaoturing, striotly socalled.
Better farm implements, together wlth new, more efficlent
methods of agrioulture,

~leased

from basic occupations numbers of

able-bodied men who made their way into the city seeking OOCUpatlon.

Employed by

40 rn

c~artamen

or merChants, they received for their

1'.

Northern Europe during the thirteenth oentury, great In...
Mrna.tiODa.l tall'• ••
held, .specially in the p~oY1nc. ot Cbuspagne. 1'0 the.. tairs came merchants ot -111 na tlon. with a tre-IIII
.endou. VlU'iety ot goods to aatl.r, the des1re. at the novelt,.and luxur,r-hung.,. provincials. See Melvin Knight, p. 201. Lipaon
I
not.s that Engliab tail'. .ere common enough, but oon.lderably le••
lavish tban thoee on the Continent. Bote, howev.r, the impre •• ive
11.t ot imports given in n. 39 above.

'I
I'

1,11'1

41.elYin

Knight, p,. 219-220.

personal labor now, not land or conaumer goods, but fixed wagea
which were redeemable ror the nec6ssities and some of the conveniences of life.

Thus many men in civil sooiety came to own little

more than their capacity to work for another, though the industrious wage

labore~

could also acquire land or other real property

through careful saving.
Money, as the life's blood of the economic system, was needed
in greater quantity to keep pace with the increased !'low ot busi ..
nesa.

Men mined the earth for precious metals which were later

minted into ooins. 42

Paper money appeared, first as private prom-

issory notes or bills or oredit, later as government paper money
or note. wtGh government approval. 43

New torma of property owner-

ship evolved from the changing economic situation.

In the field

of manuractUl'Jing, men sought to own and control not la.nd, but the

42Lipson describes the impetus Whioh Ne. World precious metals gave to English economy in the age of Elizabeth: "The influx
of precious metals from the Ne. World served to promote the growth
of a class of entrepreneurs, partly because it made the national
wealth more liquid, and partly because the ~18e in prices swelled
profits, and so encouraged investments in industrial and commercial ente~rises." (Lipson, p. 84)
4JKnight notes that great medieval Italian banking houses,
e.g., the Ricciardi and Scali, had branches throughout Western Europe and Asia Minor, including one in London. They advanc~d enormoua sums to kings, emperors, and popes, and helped to organize
the finances ot en tit'e na ti ons • Roughly frO'll 1200 to 1500 their
influence was very great throughout Europe. Later, aa Lipson commenta, English king. t'elied upon nat1ve goldsmiths, who had became
the nation'. leadIng bankers and money-lenders, tor government
loans. In 169h, six years after the publication of the Second
Treatise, the Bank of ingland was founded and began to.issue off1eial government bank notes. (S.e Melvin Knight, p. 12b; also Lipson, PP. 86.87.)
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tools of production or the raw
ucts.

~~here

l:~aterials

for

l"'>1anufactur~d

prod-

ono man's capi tal was insufficient, partnerships were

established; profits wet"e determinod accord1ng to legal contract,
and not the work-hours or personal labol' of the individual.

A neVi

economic order tool, shape, in which the control of' industry shifted from independent craftsmen

workin~

sirl,':;ly or in groups to capi-

talist omployers who stood outside the ranks of ma.nual labor. 44
The formation of the corporation, or joint-stock company, established a new form of property ovmershlp.

Stock- und bond-holders

did not add personal labor to their propel·ty or even exercise responsibility over it.

7hey simply contributed money to an econom-

ic enterprise, in return for which they recoived a fixed rate of
interest or a proportionate share of the profits. 45
All these eoonomic dovelopmen ts s torn logically from IJocka' s
labor-use theory of property as modifiod by the use of money.
Contingent factors, such as growth in population, geor,raphical 10cation, naturaal resources, technological improvements in work and

44See Lipson, pp. (31 ...82, for an account of the economio factors frOM whioh evolved a capitalist society in seventeenth century England. See nlso H. H. Tawney, Relirrion and tho Hise of
Capi tullsm .. 2nd ed. (London, 1936), pp. 13~-137:-- 45Llpson, p. 88: !lIndustry was financed not only by independent entrepreneur's utilizIng their own or borrowed cap! t1:'l.l, but
also by joint-stock companies And paptners~lips. Ji'rom the nixteenth century onwards thElse instItutions furnished an important
source of capital, since they enabled a conce:rn whoso nature or
size demanded large sums to dnrive support from a circle of investors." He concludes: "Hence the modern methods of financing industry were being widely practiced as early as the seventeenth
century" in England. (Ibid t )
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t~vel.

etc ••

f1gu~d

1n th1s economic growth also.

Yet theae ad-

vances t"I-om the state of natw:-e to organized o1vil society .e1".
eaal1y predictable, and de taqts had occurred 1n Western Europe
and England berore

1688.

Locke therefore 1n composing hls chapter

on property law 1n operat1on around hlm an economlc system quite
•• advanoed

a.

that described above.

In v1e. ot the.e evident dlfterencea bet.een atate of nature

and modern economics • •e

mle~t

••11 expeot Locke to have 1otro-

duoed aom. radioal ohangea 1n hi. propex-tJ theol"J for 01 vil soolety.

Yet none are expr•••ly made belond granting men tn a8sembl,

tbe power to tis property laws

acco~lng to 0lrcumatanoes.46 Evi-

dently then Locke expeotect that hl. orlg1nal px-lnclpl.. of proper-

ty'-ownez-ahlp oould be ma1nta1ned aa such wIthout
111 clv11 aoclet7.

108S

ot va11dl ty

In the followlng pages Lockets a •• 'l.Dlptlon hette

will be t •• ted to prove 1ta worth.

ane obvious d.tect 1ft Locke'a

propett~ theo~

tor olvll 80cl-

et7 la the abaenoe ot all tl tl.s beyond those ot personal labor on
unclaimed land, and the rlght ot oh1ldren to Inherl tance of" pro-

pert7 tram the1r papents.47

46'1,.$1••

Firat ot all then Locke should have

ch. $, aeot. 45. p. 1)8a "[lJn some parts at the
world. where the Increase ot people and stock, wlth the use ot
mone,., bad .ade land .oaroe, and
ot some value, the .everal
o01'llllUn1sle••• ttled the bounds ot their dlstinct tewltorl •• , and,
b7 law8 wltnln themselve., regulated tbe pttopertl •• ot the prlvat.
men ot thel1" aociety, and ao, by compaot and agz-eement, .ettled
tn. propers,. whlch labor and InduatP,y began,"

.0

47Plrlt !£eatta. Rt GoVtremenl. ch. 9, ••ot. 88, p. 62,
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notod that h1s lnltlal concept of personal labor Included
o~lglnal

bor. 48

title ot

tl~8t

~e

occupation a5 well as ot productive 1a-.

Thus the natural basis for the varioua legal tl ties to

property ownership would havo been

8 t~engthon&d

by the add! tlon

ot

a second natural tltle to original ownership, besIdes "the work ot
one's hands."

Likewls. turther derivative tltle. to property,

other than ramily 1nher1tanoe, would be needed

to~

organIzed

8001-

ety, .apeolally the various tItl •• ar1sing trom contractual agreements: buying and sellIng, renta, loans at Interest.49
In particular, a

ve~

Wage laboza

common contraotual title to property In clv-

11 society, should have been noted by Locke and carefully di.tlnguished from personal produotive labor on property not owned by

another.

Productlvo labor la a valId title to the th1nS produced

only if It 18 exercIsed in oneta own name, and on land or raw materials which are onets own.

flage labor, on the other hand, by

whioh one gIves up the fruit of onets labor tor a

speci~led

com-

pensation, though productive In the proces8, 18 not a tItle to
ownership of' the thIng produoed, since it 18 done in the name ot
another, and frequently with hi. raw materials and tools. SO

480tt

sup •• ch, II, P.

41.

49~ n. 70 for the distinction between original and de-

rived

t~to

propertJ.

$°Lookftts phrase, "the

turr. my servant has cut,ft to judge

from the oontext, 1s probably not a formal aclmowledgment of wage
or slave labor in tn. state ot nature, and oertainly not a definite treatment ot ~e same ae title to property. See C,O., ob. S,
seot, 27, p. 130.

Otberkinda or Boolal labor exIsted also, for which

talled to aocount.

In the complex eoonomio system of

I~ooke

seventeen~

century England, many people contributed their labor to the maklng
of a alngle product, e.g., a loaf ot brend,
For it 18 not merely the ploughman's pains, the reaper'a and ~oaherta toil, and the baker's sweat, is
to be counted into the bread we eat; the labour or
thoae who broke the oxen, who d1gged llnd Wttought the
.Iron and stonea, who felled and tramed the timber emplo1ed about the plmlgh, mill, oven, or any other utenal1s, which are a vast numher, requisIte to thIs corn,
tram lta sowlng to lts being made bread, MUst all be
charged to the .ccount of labor. and received as an
effect ot that.!>:!.
Sinco Looke hlmself gives this example ot group labor, it 1s

strange that he oftered no

expl~latlon

ot how rIval claims to

ownership could be adJustod to biB theory ot prtopertty throuY):1 labor.

Again, using the same example ot the loaf of bread, what

share did the merchant who financed the bread-making operation
ha ve

In the prof! ta trom the sale of a loaf?

Or what was the

share to be giVen the labor boss In the grain field or iron mine,
Ort the captain ot the

t~aaing

veasel that brought the wbeat Ort

other CODftodl tie. needed by the workmenJ or finally wha t was the

share or tn. Master-baker whoae genius was responsible tor the
qualitJ of the loaf?

$1

e·a•.,

43, PP. 137-138. Se. alao Jues Bonar,
IqQPgax, 3rd od. (London, 1921), p. 102,
its erficlency to the social surroundlngs
of the workman, and to tne dIvision or labour, and inventIons,
wi thout whioh he a. an !ndi vidual would Nall.e a ve't"1 interiorproduct indeed." Larkin not•• that the produot of labour depends
upon marketing conditiona, tinancial elementa, etc. Larkin, p.67.
ch.

5,

Three taotors enter tnto the production of

sect.

~11Q1gphX ~ EolltlQal
[Tlhe labou~ • • • owe.

1

10
&n7 ca.mepoiallaed product. capital,

bor.S2

manag.~nt

or braine, and la-

All tbre. d•• erve their proportionate 8ha~ 1n tne protits

tJtom the manutaotttrJed goo4,., but Looke cUd not determine how troi.
div1s10n mIght be etrected.

Finall,. Looke dId not qU8.t.lon the w.l1dl ~ of hi. prinoiples

.e.

tor intangible propertY'. e.g., bonda, 8too.k., intere.t loans, etc.
Granted that the IndJ.vldual "worke" to

that hi. mone1 1. pzto-

PeP17 inv•• te4J afterwards, the inv. . . .nt 1n another". oue labor.

to bring ....lth to 1t,. tir.t owner.

bl. proper'''. In Locke'. 4a1 and at

Aga1n, po••••• lon, of intangi~.

pre.ent t1me, otten carA ahare ot

ri•• w11i1h 1t limited rishts to oontrol one'. proPel"'.
stock la not

80

much a t1tl. to ownerah1p ... a contingent 01a1m to

camp&QJ protits.S3

Dwen ~ough .uoh new torma of propertY' are 1e-

&1 tl_ _ , the,. cannot be jus titled .s tt the work, or
Look.'s IndividualIstic eoonODl1os w.. "
state ot

nat~.

Olle t

s hand••-A

Beta derensible

tOI'

tIle

but the .tatus ot 80.0nOl!ll10 pl'o6l'eas in •• ven-

teenth oentUl"J England had al,....d1 pt-Oved that the the017 aa it

_'004 was inadequate

ti ••

69.

in 60J1Jlel"Oe

ror-

tho tull flowering ot h\.l1lAl1 potentiali-

and 1114\18t17_

52PO" Plus Xla=r!~ ~ (FOi"

appen41x

Yoar! A,ter), ••ot.
'0 RIO~L=t: '!Ji!SooI&\ Bcons
etc., p. 419.

S3Hev.; John F. Oremin, Catho].1! Bog!.. l'l'19ol,l!. (Milwauk•• ,

19>0), P.

481.

S4ae.,_ JQlm

P. Cron1n,BconomlcI and. loo.le!l (ll•• York,
b. Ol'Oll1n.~ 01 oorporatIons in model'll tim.s

1939), P. Oil.
rev18ing prop•• ',. con.eptlona. but hi8 arguments are
va1ld witbrat••enoe to Lookean property oon••pt••

~

tortlori
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The most serious defect in Looke's property theory for civil
society, however, was his failure to emphasize the social obligations of property ownership.

Property limitations for the state

of nature, e.g., wastage, the "enOUgh and as good left in common"
proviao, etc., .ere eitner invalidated by tne eoonomic cond1tions
of oivil sooiety or not brought up-to-date.

In the follOwing pa-

ges, we will briefly show the ineptness ot three Lockean social
principle a for oivil property, and then point out how Looke oould
have revised or ohanged these principles to fit seventeenth century property arrangementa.

By way of introduction, Looke'a atatement that the wide use
of money tended to produce property inequalities is not reprehensible, since it represents an historical fact. 55

Bor did he err

in his declaration that men have consented to property inequality
.f

since that too is fact.

Consent merely means that different men

obviously exhibIt different degrees of ability and industry in the
acquiaition and use of their property.

Granted these payahologi-

S, sect. ~9, p. 14o. See also Bede Jarett O.P.,
of the K1d1. ~•• (W•• tm1n1.te~. Md •• 1942i. pp.
ilil-1421 He no'Ee.\hi"'"el'lect 0 money on the medieval econon17
thua 1 "Mone,.. was beginning to take the place of land as the symbol
of power, and with money came, curiously, the sense of absolute
ownerahip. Men, whether a town or a noble or a villein, bought
their fre.dom, and wi th f'reedom naturally condi tional ownership
ceaaed, and with the lapaing of condItional ownership abaolute
ownership emerged. With absolute ownerahip came the de8ire to increase peraonal holdIngs of land, and tb1s desire dominated the
evolution of polItical hiatorT, etc • • • • " Conditional ownership
was characteriatic of the older feudal 8,..8tem of land tenure. He
conclude8, "It was moneT then that altered the attitude of the medieval mind to property." (Ibid,)
55

Soclal

G

ch.

~1e.

t_.
12

oal law8 or economics, 1hIch operate to produce wealth for a

Locke's job waa to establish norms for the use of that wealth in
conformity with private advantage and public welfare. 56
Locke's IntrodUctory princIple, that "God gave the world to
Adam and his poa ter! ty in common, '* oan be rephrased thus: everr
man haa the natural rIght to a surti.ciency or Nature's goods tor
himself and hia 4ependents .S1

In the state of nature a man could

satiety his needa by peraonal labor on his own land.

It, however,

in oi viI society wage labor ia !Rare oommon among workers, the same
principle would require that wagea be proportioned to the needs ot
the wOPkero and his tamily.

ker's labor 1. conatant

bo~

'!he basio eaming-power ot the wor-

in the atate ot nature and in civil

sooiety, since it il tn. ord1narr meana tor a man under any ciroumatance. to attain m04erate comfort and prosperity in this lite.
On the other hand, it hi. wages do not match hi. needa, then the

worker and hi. family do not participate fully 1n God'. grant ot
the world to all men. 58

S6CatholicSoclal Prinoiples, p. 5.3: It[!lhere Is .. real senae
in which morai law takes preoedenoe over economic or physical
laws. While we cannot Ignore genuIne laws In the economIc field,
orten can alter circumatances and condltiona, so that, under
the aame law•• dlfterent reault. will ensue. n

w.

51In support ot the fIrat-named prinoiple, Locke saya: "[Ilen
being onoe born, bave a right to thelr pre.ervation, and consequently to meat and drink, an4suchother thIngs·as Nature aft9rds
tor theIr subs1stenoe, • • • "--~, ch. 5, .eot. 24, p. 129.

58a.rum .ov~•• eo'. 24, p. )86. Leo notea that labor 1a .
not only p.rsona and thua negotIable at a given prioe, but neoeasary to pre.erve the workman and his dependents.
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PurthemoH, In the atat. or nature, Locke conditioned Indi.
vidual aoquiai'ion ot land and goods by the olause tbat there be
"enough and aa good lett In oommon

tOI'

othel'a.- S9

In 01vl1 .001....

t" bowevol', all us.bl.land la already 01.1med by prlvat. ownera.
Henoe the proviso Is usel ... unl•• a 1,. bo tN.n8tormed into a JIOIIIe
oon-..rpOl'lU"J aoolal pJ:tinolple, e.g., tba t no one ahould 4.libel'"-

.'.17 u•• hi. propertf. even wltb1n tne bound. ot oommutatlve juett •• ,

80

aa to injure the baatc l'1gb.ta and needa ot othe".

or .uGh

ple.

Exam-

legal lnjuaU.o ape wage contraots In which the

1'1ght. of the Bakel' pal'. ape aaoP1tloed

tOI'

the aake at .terial

galn, or the ellaotllent of mon.y....-.1cing cO%'pOl'atlOll polielea which
Indlreotl,. oause grave ham '0 Indl"lduala and 8omet!mes the en-

t1re oommwd ty. 60

Undo!' Lock.an theo!WJ, the pr•••I'Y. tlon ot Individual J)POperty 1. the du,," at the atato. 61 Yet the state 1.
bound to aateguard only
alnee

o~er

~e

oommltment. ot cOM8Utatlv8 juatice,

prlnolplea ot .oclal juat!•• and oharl t1

W8l'e

not aet

forth ·b, Locke. 62

Pinall,-. though the na'-al limitation at ".,astage" ot go04s

-

~92a!L. Ch. S, aeot. 26, P. 130, a•• ta. 32-33, PP. 132-133.

~a:t.ihI.
p. 61. S. . &1ao
A!I1i •
••0'. ~-=
1a J:dm.lI.,=
SOI&" leono. ,~1ao
P. . •
6lc..~•• oh. 1, ••ot. 1. ,. U8, ch. 9, .eet. 124, p. 180.

62cOOlc up•• t'Poa Locke'. th80J71 .. (A)n:r le.l ."Item ot
pJ)'Opeptr ......hlp whiGh 4 ... Dot deny men an adequate pe••l'd tor
~.1. lebo. &b4 go04. auttiolent to meet thel~ need• .., be ~U8tl
tied, though this ottel's no meaSUI'. elthel' of labor 01' need. -Oook, P. lCDt.

14
or lands was obviously invalidated by the

Intr~luctlon

or monoy as

"some lasting thing that men might keep without spoiling," perhaps
it alao could be modltled tor use in organised soclety.63

The law

of wa.tage aought to pttevent a supernulty at goods In one man t •
posseaaion, which would 81 the%- spoil or, being kept without pur-

pose, prove uaeless to owner and neIghbors allko. 64

In olvI1

80-

olet,., the principle ot wastage could govern the use ot exoeS8
wealth.

Boar41ng of money or lulurloua living beyond the dictatea

ot proprlet7 could be termed a waatetul use ot wealth.

Wealthy

men then would be prescribed to uae their exce88 money for purpo.e. botb personal11 and aoclally u.etul. 6S
These and othel" noma could have been formulated by Locke

through tn. revlslon at prlnolples laid down in hia chapter on
propel'tJ.

Slnco be oontined, however, hi. application at aoolal

princlpl •• to the prim1tive state ot nature, he neoeasarl1y shltted the responsIbility of regulatIng civil property tor the common

63 c,O"

ch.

5.

aeot.

47,

p. 1)9.

64Ib&s! •• 8eot, )0, P. 131: sect•• )7, 38, PP. 134-136.
6SLooke himself gives foundatIon for this demand that the
w.alth1 use theIr exo••• p08s8aaiona fo.r aoolally useful purposes.
"[Ilt the fru1ts rotted or the venison putrefied before he oould
.pend 1t, he ottended agalnat the oommon law at Natura, and w.a
liable to b. puniahod: he invaded hi. neighbor's ahare, for he had
no right f'&1"'ther than h1. usa oallad tor &n7 of them, and they
might .eJlve to afford him convenienoe. at 11te." (,2.&. oh. 5,
••ot, 37, p • 1)4-1lS). Further specifioatlon 01"
and oqQvlD01"
1" would be naoess&l"1 to count this an e featlve 80-

tif:
'rae,
o
prInolp .,

us,

7$
good to the legislative assembly of the civil governrnent. 66
the common

int~rest

tnerefore, the state legislature

~y

In

further

apecit'y ind1vidual property arrangements, but within these bounds.
the laws that are established should be for all alike and in &0cordance with
have all or

~~e

ar~

universal law of nature) 8econdly, no man anall

part ot his proporty taken away trom him without

his oonsent, or at least the consent of the majority through their
duly eleoted repre ••nta'lvel or by their own actlon •• 67

Largely

beoause of inherent dlrrlcultl.s conneoted with Locke's oonceptlon
of the law

or

nature and majority-rule, he exposed civil sooiety

to two dangers through legislative notion.

First an

a£~embly

or

large property owners would be reluctant to pass legislation
against the interest. of Its own members. 68

Henoe suoh a majorlt,y

m1ght conclude tlla t i t was acoording to reason or the 1.ll'lWrl tten
law of na tw-e tha t property in teres ts be allowed to operate unhindered by governmental actlon, except in oase8 where commutative
justice was violated.

On tne other hand, a radical

ass~bly

ot

66 Ib1d., SBot. l8, p. 135; soct. 45, p. 138; ch. 11, sect.

ll4, P. i83.

67 Ibid " oh. 11, sect•• 134-142, pp. 18)-190.
68wl111am Y. Elliott and Nell A. McDonald, Western PolItical
Herltage (new York, 1949), PP. 545-546: "!he majority slmply w*l~
not take away property r1ght., Locke thinks, because the majorlt,y
Is oomposed ot indIv1duals who are all concerned w1th the protectIon ot property rights--a convenient theo17 and not a.n unreasonable one 180 long as the electorate 1n England was 11mi ted to property holders and dominated by the squlrearchy ot t he seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries."

non-property owners might consldet· it nore in acco.rdance with reason to restrict t.ne exercise of property ri(",hts by multifarious

gov~rnment regulations. 69
A truly rational, unbiased body of men could work out a series of proporty

re~~lations

equitable for all, but Locke would

have acted moro prudently ,if he had provided concrete principles
of social justice, derived from the law of nature, by which the
legislators mifrpt determine th.eir property measures.

Why he did

not do so, and some of the consequoncos of his failure in this respect, will be indicated in the next chapter.

69Governmontal regulation to the point of Socialism or government ownership of property would seem to be forestalled by
Locke's statement: "For the preservation of property being the end
of govern.!l1ont, and that for v/hich men enter into society, it necessarily supposes and requiro& that the people should have property, wi thou t which they mus t bo supposed to lose the. t by entering
into civil society wllich was the end for which they entered into
it. "--.£.&.2.,., ch. 11, sect. 138, p. 187.

CHAPTER IV
CONCLUDING REMARKS
1.

Lockean and Papal i'heoI7

TWo centuries atter the publicatIon ot the !WO treatise,
eiv,' Ggv'EDment, Pope Leo XIII, on May

15,

~

1891, published an en-

oyc11cal on the social questIon, i.e., the rights and duties ot
rich and poor, capital and labor, with1n organized society.

Ti-

tled Re:rwa lovarum (.9.Q Ji!1!. Oondition .2t. Lab2£), the enoyolical
treated at length the origin, nature, and proper u.e of private
property.1 Same people have protesaed to find a a1m11arity 1n the
wq in wh1ch Locke and Pope Leo XIII set out to jua'it;y the right

ot private proper.,.

The similar1ty 1. undoubtedly there, and it

w111 b. interestIng to note how tar-this s1m11arIt,y goe., and at
the same tIme u.etul to .ee how Leo XIII (along with his successor
Pope Pius XI) reconcl1.s thIs basically private right ot property
w1 til the demands of the common good.
Three reasons are gIven by Leo why ownership of property is
natural to man a. an IndIvidual.

F1rst, man as a creature with

reason and tree wl11, 1 ••• , a8 a moral being, should possess the
lOt. Rerum lova~um, .ecta. 3-8 pp. 367-)70.
s.simo &'!!:!2. .ects.
'-52, pp. 412=415.

77

Alao Quadra-
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right of ownership which is
material things aa his own.

~~o

moral power to dispose freely ot

Secondly, mants rational nature urges

him to provide for tuture contingenoies aa well as present enjoyment.

Thirdly, whIle material things are clearly ordained for the

uae ot man, and man in turn requires them tor his preservatIon and
pertection, h. must trequently labor over them to make them suitable tor his own use.

Tbis labor, aa the impress ot human person-

ality on material oreation, so unites the material good with the
laborer aa to make it part of himself and therefore his property
by natural right. 2
Locke's argument for property as a natural right was twofold.
Property was justified first of all as necessary to satisfy man's
needs, and secondly, as the proper expression of human personality
man's personal freedom to dispose of himself and his effects as he
thinks best.)

Looke and Leo XIII are united in maintaining that

productive labor as the expression of human personality is an adequate title to ownersh1p of material goods, a bridge between the
individual man and thia or that particular good.4

Furthermore,

Locke'a contention that God-given reason in man prompt. him to ap-

2¥rum Nova£U!D, sects.

)0,0,. ch.

5-7, pp. 368-36<).

5, secta. 25-26, pp. 129-130. See also oh. II,

P. 40.

4Locke ia le •• careful than Leo in distinguishing Droductive
labo£ tFom the more general persgnal la09£. See Rerum ovarum,
seot. 8, p. 370: "For the soil which is tilled and cultivated with
toil and skill utterly changes its condition; it was wild befope,
it 1s now t~u1ttulJ • • • "
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propriate things as his own from Nature's storehouse unites him
with the first Leonine argument, that based on the rational nature
of man. 5 Again, when Locke develops his argument for the ownership of land as well as consumer goods, he anticipates the Leonine
position that man should provide for the future by possession of
the earth itself as well as its fruits. 6
In addition, Locke and Leo agree that no limits exist for the

acquisition of property beyond "man's own industzay and the laws of
individual peoples.,,7

Unlike Locke, however, Leo did not postu-

late for laboza or human industzay a further lim1tat1on of wastage,
which later was to be ciroumvented by the use of money.
nozam for all degrees of economic progress was that

tf

His basic

['r]he earth,

though divided among private owners, ceases not thereby to minister to the needs of a1l.,,8

In addition, in his treatment of money

and material wealth, he shows a far greater understanding of the
social obligations of property than does Locke.

Leo carefully

5~, ch. 5. sect. 25, p. 129.
6

Ibid., sect. 31, p. 132; RerHe Novarum, sect. 0, pp. 368-

7Rerum Novarum, sect. 6
·8
.
,pp.
36 -3b9.
Also~, ch. 5,
•• ct. 45, p. 138: "[T]he soveral communities settled the hound. of
their distinct territories, and, by laws, within themselves, regulated the properties ot the privata men of their society, and so.
by compact and agreement, settled the property which labour and
industry began." B.S.: Neither authoza denies the possibility ot
extrinsic property limitation, but both agree that this regulation
is a matter tor positive or civil law, not natural law.

aRerum

Novarum, sact. 7, p. 369.

r
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distinguished between the natural r1ght of ownership and its proper use.

The f1rst is necessarily exclus1ve of all beside the in

dividual owner, or it oeases to be a right of private property.
The use, however, of material goods should be oammon.

He quotes

St. Thomas Aquinas: "Man should not consider his outward possessions as his own, but as common to all, so as to share them without dIfficulty when others are in need. ft9 No one is requi:t-ed to
give to others what he and his dependents need for self.
preservation, or even for moderate comfort, in keeping with thei:tsoolal position; but all men have a duty founded on Christian
charity to give superfluous wealth to the indigent.
cludes

w~th

Leo con-

the general social principle: "Whoever has received

from the Divine bounty a large share of blessings, whether they b
external and corporal, or gifts of the mind, has'received them fo
the purpose of using them for perfeoting his own nature, and, at
the aame time, that he may employ them, as t..11.e minis ter of God· s
Providence, for the benefit of others ••flO
Locke was silent on

th~

duties of ownership after once af-

firming the wastage l1mitation, and adding the proviso that there
should always be enough and as good left 1n common for others. 11

9Rerum Novarum, sect. 19. p. 316. Quotat1on rrom Summa Theo
10glae, IIa-Ilae, q. 66, art. 2 0: Op.ra Omnia, III. 247:248,---10 Ib1d ,

p.

11~, eh. 5,

132 ..

sect. 26, p. 130; sect. 30, p. 1311 sect. 32,

r
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Moreover, by his own admission, the use of money

circl~vented

the

wastage clause and brought on such a fever for additional land
that the other proviso was made ineffective also. 12 nlUS material
wealth, though not explicitly proposed by Locke as an end in itself, easily became such in lieu of a higher goal. 13
Here perhaps is the most fundamental difference between Locke
and Leo on the property question.

Leo saw property, in fact, the

entire economic order, as a rf1eans ordained to higher spiri tual
ends.

Men must first realize that they are creatures of a common

Maker, God Himself; that they are directed to Him as their common
end; and that they all have been redeemed by Jesus Christ and
raised to the dignity of children of Go~ and heirs of heaven. 14
In this hierarchy of values, the gifts of nature, including material wealth, are seen as temporal supports to be used by all in
the attainment of their

co~~on

end.

Leo's doctrine on

prope~ty

is

superior to Locke's Views, precisely because he sets material
wealth within a greater hiterarchy of values.

When wealth is con-

sidered as an end desirable in itself, it sharpens the acquisitive
12 Ibid., sect. 4
'5, p. 139; sect. 51, p. 1 41.
13Herbert Johnson, "Some He:r.:tarks about Locke's Teachings on
Property," new Scholasticism, XXIV (April 1950), 150: "And since
money does not spoil with time, there is no limit to the amount
that any man may jus tly heap up for himself. ",{eal th is no longer
a 1"1eanS, for a means is lim! ted by the end to which it is directed, as medicine to health; it has become an end, to be pm"sued
without limit :ror its own sake."
14Rerum Novarum, sect. 21, p. 377; sect. 32, p. 384.
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instincts of men so greatly that they become oblivious of the
r1ghts and needs of others in the same line of economic se1fsufficiency.

This ant1-social attitude often prodUces ereat pro-

perty 1nequalities among men, and consequent unpest and hostility
between rich and poor. lS
Fope Pius XI, in his encyclical Quadragesimo

~

(Forty

Year! After), published in May, 1931, confirmed and furthered many
of the doctrines advanced by Leo XIII in Rerum Novarum.

Pi~s

de-

clares t..'1at apart f'rom revelation, "reason eleaI'11 deduces from
the nature of things and from the Individual and socla1 character
of man, what is the end and object of the whole economic order assigned by God the Creator. n16 He adds that with proper subordination of values, "particular economic aims whether of soclety as a
body or of individuals will be intimately linked with the universal teleological order," with the consequence that men will be led
through economic activity to their f1nal end, God Himself, "our
highe.t and lasting 000d."17

Furthermore, he notes that the right

working of the economic order itself' is upset by unrestrained free

l5~, sects. 1-2, pp. 366-367; guadrasesim2 Ane2, sects.
3-5, PP. 4()1~02. See Charles p. Bruehl, The Fope's Plan tor Social Reconstruction (New York, 1939), p. lI3i "Sane economICS will
insist on the human and personal character of industry, tor when
tnis factor is left out o~ consideration production loses all
meaning and is deprIved ot every principle of regulatIon."
16guadraSeaimo Anno, sect.
17 Ibid., sect. ~,p.
I.~
412.

43,

p. 412.

8)
competition in search of material wealth.

Over-production of

goods, or the excessive lowering and raising of wages, with an eye
to private profit, trequently bring about economic depressions
with disastrous consequence. to individuals and nations. 18 Thus
for the more harmonious attainment ot its own end, as well as
those spiritual ends to which it is ordained as a means, the economic and social organism must secure "for all and eaoh those
goods which the wealth and resources ot nature, technical achievement, and the social organization of economic atfairs can give. ul9

With adequate distribution of material goods, and widespread employment, men w111 be uplifted "to that higher level of prosper1ty
and culture which, provided 1t be used with prudence, 1s not only

no h1ndrance, but 1s ot singular help to virtue," and we might
add, to the proper fUnctloning of the economlc order itaelt. 20
One other point in which Pius expands on Leo XIII'. doctrine
i. in the matter ot superfluous wealth.

Where Leo advocated giv-

ing superfluous wealth to the indigent as alma, Pius claimed that

Bt.

18
Ibld" seots. 14-15, p. 421. See also Economics ~ Socie.
p. 153J Bruehl, pp. 98-99, 112-114.
19Quadraseslmo ~, sect.
20

15.

p. 421.

Ibid, See also Bruehl, p. 112: "To maintain the right balance between production and consumption and to enable consumption
to keep pace with production, it is essential that the various
tactors entering into the creation of wealth acquire by their productive activities and services claims to ehare In the ultimate
produot to such an extent that the created wealth will really be
consumed. If this ls accompllaned, the economic process wl11 actually be self-perpetuating. Soclal wealth, in other worda, must
be self.distributory."

r

the particular needs

or

contemporary industrial sooiety urged

rather the investment ot superrluous inoome in job-producing industries and oooupationa, "provided the labor employed produces
results whioh are really useful."Zl
vantages
tt

or

Charles Bruehl notes the ad-

uliberality," as Pius oonoeived it, over Leonine

alm.gi vIng" thus, r'Ualng property insociall,. beneficial ways is

no longer that of a charitable distribution ot superfluous income,
but rather that of a soc1ally helpful business investment.

The

1deal modern propert1-owner opens up to his rellow men opportunit1.s of emplo,yment by meana ot whioh they acquire the neoessaries

ot lite, and eventually became propert,T-holdera in their own
right. •

• •

AlmaS! v1ng 1s ot second8.1'7 consideration in oU%" eco ...

nomic system; and should be restrioted to such casea where an ind1v1dual 11 unable to perform eoonomically prof1table .ark. a22
Prom a propertf v1ewpo1nt, therefore, an individual 1. justified
in the po •••ss10n ot enormous wealth provided he uses it tor socia1l1 benetic1al purpose., and not private advantage alone. 23

21guadragea1t!o Anno, secta.
22Bruehl, p.

$0-51,

pp.

414-415.

79.

23Becauae of the unequal talents and moral qualities ot men,
1 t ia undoubtedly true that the oOlllmon good ot the communIty is
orten b.tte~ served by 80me large individual property holdings In
the handa ot experienced entrepreneurs who can make them produoe
in abundance so01al17 useful goods than by an egalitarIan distribution ot property among a host ot inept or shittless-amall owners. -S.e also~ Ti1.010fRae, 111.-11"8, q. 66, art. 2 Ct Opera
e value of leg1t1mate self-1nterest
Omnia, IIIi pp.2q:7":2ij:tf on
1n soc1ety_

r
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2.

Explanations of Locke'. Pailure

Locke_ as we noted above, aaw in operation around him an increasingly complex economic system, far removed from the primitive
condItions described tor the state of nature.

Why then did he not

evolve a set of property rights and duties for contemporary civil
society as he had done for the state of nature?

Or, it time and

space did not permit such an enlargement of his discussion of property, why did he not at least set forth certain principles of social obligation tram which another could later work out the required regulat1ons.

In the following pages, various opinions will

be g1ven why Locke did not undertake this obvious task.
First of all, various historioal arguments are proposed.

The

first presupposes that Lockets a1m in the First Treatise was to
dismiss hereditary monarchy posaeasing absolute power_ and in the
S!pond Treatise to vindIcate constitutional government based on
the consent of the people.24

Thus certain 11nea of thought were

shut off by the nat~e of the polemic whiCh he was writing.

One

would be the obligat1ons of property-ownership, over and above
commutative Justice, since the question of state regulation of
property tor the common good would easily arise. 25

24This supposition i8 well established.

As we noted

See oh. I1_ PP. 18-

19; oh. III, pp. 52-53. See also Cook, p. xiii.

25 Jamea Collins. A Histor! ot Modern European Philosophy
(Milwaukee, 1954). p. 359: fi£B is-polemical aim [Lockeis] requires
him to lay stress upon the independence and equality of men • • • n
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land until the ttm. of the Industrial Revolution. 2 9 Again, as
Charl~1

Sherman point. out, Looke seemed out of contact with tn.

laboring clalses in England, who.e intere.ts aa a group most requ1~ed an exposition of the social obligationa of .ealth.3 0

POI'

example, what good wal Looke's property theorJ to one wlthout actual pOlsessiona.3 l

Henoe, conclude. Sherman, not the great mass

ot town and count17 laborers, but those "whoBe ind1 vidual in! tia-

tive had. secured economic galns.which theY' were unwilling to see
despotism wrest from them," i.e., the propertied classes, benefit.
ed chietl,. trOll Locke's theo17. 32

Protessor Collins claims that 1t was Lockets particular approaoh to philosophy 1Ihich brought about his absence of soc1al
thinking.

!he analytical tendency ot his philosophioal method

whioh 1n epiBtemology broke up cognition into sensation and re ....
fleotlon, "reduced 8001al lite to the atomic individuals from
which 1 t might be supposed. to o~lglnate. "3.3

29Gough, p.

Thua disconnected,

84.

;30Charl.s L. Sherman, ftlntroduction to 'lr~t;'!' .2t Civil
Government and A Letter concernies 'olerat~on:ohnLOcke" tNe.

tori, 19j7)';P.-Xlv.

31 Ibid., ala,? Larkin, pp. 77-79; Cook, P. xxx.

32Sherman, p. xiv.
33Colliru., p. 360. LOcke'. analysis of human cognition is
found in An Eesf ooncernlmL Human Under.a tandinf' Bk. II (n On
.
Ideas") # ~11s~PhIl. t pp. ~f:! ...~t6. 'or examp as of his analytical proce~e,·.ee especially ch. 1~ pp. 2h8-Z53J oh. 3. pp. 25k.·
2551 ch, 8, pp. 26)-271; ch, 11, pp. 279-Ze)J ch •. 12, pp. 28.3-2B5.
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the Lockean members of sooiety never coalesced to

fo~

a civil

government with a common good other than the aggregate sum at individual goods or the interests of the majority.34

Herbert John-

son attributes this lack ot a true common good in Locke's theory
ot civil society to hls sensism in epistemology.

Since his know.

ledge or a person, philosophically speaking, was only a composite
ot sense iapresatons, he could not logioally inter to the existence ot a common human nature on whlch a true soolal end or oivil
soclety could be establlshed. 3S
Leo Strauss presents perhaps the most challenging interpretation ot Looke's theory ot property, with special reference to his
laok ot 80cial consciousness.

As noted earlier, Strauss conceives

Locke as concealing a revolutionary doctrine at property beneath
the conventional trappings ot the state ot nature, primitive man,
eto. 36

In reality. he i8 the evangelist of a new Gospel of labor,

in which "industrIoU8 and rational" men will use their acquisitive
instincts to create a world of plenty for all.

Par trom regula-

ting property in the interests of the publio weltare, "[cJivil

80-

ciety merely creates the conditions under which the individuals
can pursue their productive.acquisitive activity wlthout obstruc-

3400111ns, PP. 311-312.
3SJohnson. "Some aemarks etc • • •

368e• oh. I, pp. 7-8, nne 14-16.

.,"
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tion."37

A. proof of his interpretation, Strauss notes that the

right to appropriate is considerably more limited in the state of
nature than in civil soc1ety.3 8

This ia so because the stateot

nature was a condit1on ot penury 1n which wastage of good. while
others starved was a serious ottense. 39

Money was the institution

which liberated men's acquisitive instincts and set them on the
road to prosperity in civil society.4 o The great end therefore of
civil soc1ety MUst be the preservation of individual property in
order that men, unchecked by private theft or c1vil regulation,
may exploit their love of gain to the fullest and thus create unprecedented temporal prosperity for 811. 41
In Strausa'a own word., Locke'a property theory should be in-

terpreted as "the clasaic doctrine of tthe spirit ot capital1••• -"42 Locke, therefore, instead ot miainterpreting the econaml7Strauaa, Batural Right ~ Bisto£Z, p.

246.

38Strauaa here ignore. the regulatory powers ot legislative
bodies to alter property arrangement.. See~, Ch. 5, a.ct. 45,
p. 138.
39Strauaa, p. 239.
40Ibid., p. 248.
41 Ibid ., PP. 244-~5, 247. See a180 Tawney, p. 179.
4 2 Ibid ., p. 246. Tawney's thesis in the latter part ot aeliston and the Rise of Caeitalism ia that the spirit of capitalIsm,
t e unashamed-noroveof galii," should be connected with the growth
of Puri tan1s. among the merchant class8. in seventeenth century
England. (Tawney, Pp. 246.247) Supposing that a connection exIsts between Locke and seventeenth century English Puritanism (a
point which this thesis w111 not consider), Strauss's interpretation of the property theory streng~~ens this connection.
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scene of his day, was rather a genuine prophet ot the new age ot
laissez-taire oapitalism and its dedioated apologist.

Lockets

doctrines historioally supported individualistic capitalism 1n
eighteenth century England.43

Yet this does not nGcessarily imply

that Locke oonsciously planned an apologia of laispoz-faire economics.

Sabine says of Locke's political theory that it represen-

ted a somewhat inconsistent amalgam of 30cial and political concepts in seventeenth century England. 44 Yet it profoundly affected English constitutional

~~eory

for several generations, because

it so neatly synthesized the various strains of current philosophical opinion. 45

In similar fashion, we may conjecture that

Lockets economio theory was not an esoteric revolutionary doctrine
of indiVidualistic economics, but all. amalgam of past and present
theories of property, solected with an eye to contemporary econam-

43see Coll1ns. p. 362: "Desp1te h1s generous conception at
fproperty' as inoluding tne happiness and liberty ot ind1viduals,
Locke's dictum that 'government has no other end but ~le preservat10n of property' worked h1stor1cally as a bulwark or 1ndiv1dualisticand laissez-fairs polioies." See also Cook, p. xxxv.
44Sab1nel p. 537. Also Gough, pp. 70-71: "The state of nature and 1 ts whole concomitant apparatua of natural rights and the
social contract was the re2;ular stock-in-trade of the poll tical
writers ot his age."
45col11n8, PP. 355-3S6. Cook and Gough, however, believe
that Locke's theories d1d not influence constitutional thoueBt so
much aa substantiate or legalize actual histor1cal institutions
already operatinr: within the Brit1sh constitution, e.g., majority-rule. See Cook, P. xxxii; Gough, PP. 70-71. N.B.: Under either
1nterpretation, however, Locke oannot be conceived of as a revolutionary.
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10 and political oonditions in England.46 When tirst published,
his theory won ready aooeptance with the propertIed classes; yet
1n the following century it became the "bible" of early English
loclalists.47

This tact alone may Indicate its eclectic character

as a treatise on property.

3. Consequences ot Locke'. FaIlure
Comparison ot Locke with Pope Leo XIII and Pope Pius XI on
p.lnciple. ot property ownership demonstrated that no serious
treatment ot civil property can omit consideration at the 1001al
nature ot propert)" wIthout great potential harm to the commmi ty
.. w.l1 aa to Individuals.48 Yet tor one or more ot the reasons
g1ven In the aeotion immediately preceding, Locke omitted an adequate oonlideration ot property as a 100ial institution.

Granted

that In Lockean civ11 socletr the legislature has the power to alter existing property arrangements tor the common good, ditficult1 •• oonneot.d with a

un1~or,m

interpretation ot the law of nature

4Esi~ Wil11am PettT. in hi. freati!t,0t Taxea (1662), stated
01ear11 the labor-value theopY ot proper:- See I.A. J. Johnson,
~e~0,s'08,2t MY! ~ (New York. 1937), p. 243. See also
.
ou,
n.-2-;-- ~not.8 that in the labor theory of appropriation Locke took doctrines already established and joined them
together: the doctrine ot property as a natural adjunct ot personality, and otproperty as justified by the labor of its creation
or production. See Cook, p. xxvi. Alao ch. II, p. 40.

P..

471ax Beer~
I, 101.

48See

pp.

!

Hlatorz gt British 80c1a11am (London, 1919),

79-84.
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and wIth the institution of majority-rule in civil assemblies easily impede the passage
ters.49

or

true social legislation in property mat-

Furthermore, Locke lert no norma for the determination ot

a true common good over and above the needs ot particular individuals. SO
Bequeathing therefore to his tollowers what was virtually an
absolute right of private property, Looke seriously damaged the
entire rational basis ot the right.
in his work,

~

PublIc

PhilosoE~'

As Walter Lippmann points out
property rights without cor-

responding property duties eventually destroy the ratIonale ot
private property.Sl

Lippmann'. own theory ot property indirectly

.erves as an example ot this process.

Lamenting the inequalltiea

wblch the abuse of Ind1vldual property rights etfected in modern
civ11 soolety, Lippmann seeks to

re~estab11ah

property rIghts on

"the grand ends of civ11 sooiety," contemplated by the noted Eng11ah jurist, Wil11am Blaokstone, in the eighteenth century.S2

49~,

In

ch. 11, pp. 183-190; esp. sect. 134. pp. 183-184.

SOSee PP. 87-88 tor explanations by James Collins and Herbert
Johnson tor this notable deficiency in Lockets political theory.
SlWalter Lippmann, The
P. 121.

Publ~c Philosophr (Boston, 1955),

S2LiPpmann, p. 120. He is quoting Sir william Blackstone,
Commentaries on the Laws ot England, Bk. II, ch. 1: n • • • the
legislature ot England has universally promoted the grand ends ot
civil society, the peace and security of individuals, by steadily
pursuIng that wise and orderly maxim by assiSBing to everyth1ng
capable ot ownership a legal and determinate owner." (Ibid ••
p. 119)
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this way the natural right of property and its free exercise are
shifted trom the avaricious individual to the community, anxious
only for the common good.

Yet, however flagrant the abuses of in-

dividual property ownership and however grand the ends of civil
SOCiety, the immediate result of this transter ot rights is pOlitivism.

Aa Lippmann b1maelt declares, "The rights ot property ••

are a creation ot the la.". of the state.

And since the la.". can

be altered, there are no ablolute rIghts of property.

There are

legal rIght. to use and to enloy and to dIspose ot property."S3
Furthermore, though Lippmann might deny that his theory ot
property leads to colleotivism, or governmental ownership and control of property, hi. own words that the ultimate title to property is vested in "mankInd, the People, as a corporate community,"
prove the oPPosite.54

The People as a corporate group can ertec-

tively express their wl11 only through the organ of a duly constituted government.

Then because the natural basis of property as

an indivIdual right has been already supplanted by- positive law,

government leaders can ea8ily assert, and make effective by law,
the right ot the government a8 the ofticial representative of the
community to own and control property formerly under private ownership and control.

By legislation collective ownership replace.

SJ Ibidt , pp. 118-119.
S4Ibid., p. 119. Collecti viam: ttA poll tical and economlc
theor,- of social organization based on collective or governmenta.l
ownership and democra.tic management of the essential means for the
production and distribution of goods."--Webst. New Coll., p. 944.
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private property.
Thus some form of oollectivism logically follows an uninhibi~ed

pursuance of rugged individualism.

The intermediate step 1n

which positive law is substituted for natural law as the basis of'
individual property rights, is taken to remedy the abuses spawned
by excessive 1ndividualism.

To maintain the proper balanoe be-

tween the two extremes, the principles of' Pope Pius XI in QuadragesimQ Anno are ver.y helpful.

Pius notes that property ownership

baa a twotold aspeot: "which is individual or social accordingly
as it regards individuals or concerns the common good."S5

To em-

phasize one aspect too much is to encourage either Individualism
or Collectivism.

Furthermore, both Pius XI and Leo XIII

(in~

rum Novarym) distingu1sh between the right of property and its
proper Use.

The property right must be held by private indiv1du-

als, but should be used in such a way as to promote the common
good along Wi~l the good of the individual. 56
Pinally, though the property right must be founded in the
natural law to safeguard its natural basis in the individual, yet
principles of pos1t1ve law are also needed to determine a workable
system of' property rIghts and dutIes in c1vil sooiety.

The ambi-

gu1ty of' natural law principles of' property in particular oiroumstanoes and the need for a positive check to the unprincipled

55g.uadr&ges1mo!m!2., seet.

56Ib1d.,

45,

p. l t 12.

sects. 47-48, p. 413J also Rerum Novarum, sect.
~P. 375-376; also pp. 19~O of this chapter.

19,

r
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greed of individuals demand the oreation of a system of positive
law to supplement natural law.

In addition, positive property

legislation is required to establish

t~e

condi tions rlecessary for

a true co17n'11on good, e.g., the erection of schoolo, hospitals.

roads through taxation,

ap~ropriation,

etc.

fllUS

property as a

total institution in modern society is a complex of mutually interdependent positivo qnd natural law.57

r.n

summary, then, conce!"ning TJocke r s intentions as a poll ti-

cal a.nd economio theorist, Professor Sabine's encomium of the man
expresses our own opinion also: "His sincerity, his profound moral
conviction, his genuine belief in liberty, in human rights. and in
the dignity of human nature, united with his moderation and good
sense, made him the ideal spokesman of a middle-class revolution."5 8 His theory of property exhibits certain glaring defioienoies, as we have noted in the preceding pages.

The subordina-

tion of the property theory to the aims of the entire Treatise £a
Civil Government certainly accounts for some of these errors.

Yet

with its defects Locke's property theory had a profolmd effect on
1<.ngliah economic and poli tica.l development in the ei["pteenth century.59

EVen today commentators acknowledge t..'1.a.t John Locke,

faulty logic H.nd oversimplified explanations notwithstanding,

57See Quadragesimo ~, sect. 49, pp. 413-414; also Rerum
Novarum, sect. " p. 309; and p. 79 of this chapter.
58sablne, p.

540.

59Gough, p .. 91.

See also 00. I, pp. 11-13.
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reached many of the right oonolusions in the very important and
involved field of property rights and duties.

r
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